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TINKER'S LEGACY: FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS
Until recently, the infringement of children's rights seldom had been
brought before the courts for redress. This was due to the concept of parens
patriae, which grants the state power of guardianship over minors and al-
most unlimited discretion in the manner and focus of that power. ' In addi-
tion, on those rare occasions when children's rights issues were litigated, the
courts focused on the nature and constitutionally permissible extent of the
states' power over children. Quite simply, there existed no body of law gov-
erning the constitutional rights of minors. In the past ten years, however,
there has been an increasing number of cases in this area, and the focus has
shifted to the delineation of specific rights for children.
The major impetus for this change is found in a trilogy of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court. In re Gault, Ginsberg v. New York, and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 2 were de-
cided in the late 1960's. Although the holdings in earlier cases had the effect
of protecting the rights of children, these three decisions initiated and fur-
thered the development of the concept that children are persons under the
Constitution and therefore should be protected by it. The Gault-Ginsberg-
Tinker trilogy established a policy that the rights of minors are entitled to
constitutional protection from infringement by the states. However, these
cases did not detail guidelines for implementing that policy. Nor did they
hold that children's rights are co-extensive with those of adults.
The true significance of the Gault-Ginsberg-Tinker trilogy, however, be-
comes apparent only when considered in the context of the Supreme Court's
prior attitude toward children. Accordingly, Section I of this Comment will
examine in detail the background and foundation for these developments.
Such an examination also will facilitate an understanding of the recent de-
velopments in children's rights law by the lower federal courts.
The response in the lower courts has been the principled expansion of
children's rights within the framework of the Supreme Court's policy. The
extent of this expansion, however, varies with the particular circuit involved.
In Section II, this Comment will analyze one facet of this expansion by dis-
cussing the federal case law regarding the free press rights of public high
school students. Specifically, it will investigate the federal courts' application
of the prior restraint doctrine in the high school setting.
Finally, this Comment will examine the impact of these developments on
the school environment. This impact includes broad policy changes in favor
of the accommodation of student expression as well as specific responses by
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115,
145 P. 872 (1915).
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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defendant school boards to court decrees. However, as will be shown, there
is still a critical need for continued efforts to secure and extend the constitu-
tional rights of minors both in and out of the courts.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT'S
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF CHILDREN'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Early Developments
In its early opinions, the Supreme Court attempted to establish and define
the limits of the state's power to control its minor citizens. This is illustrated
by the language and manner in which the issues were framed. In Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,3 a 1940 decision, the Court upheld a statute mak-
ing the flag-salute compulsory in public schools. Three years later, this hold-
ing was overruled in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,4 where
a statute based on the ruling and language of Gobitis was termed an
infringement of First Amendment rights. Even though Barnette was, in ef-
fect, a delineation of students' rights, this effect was merely collateral since
the focus of the opinion was directed at states' rights. As will be dem-
onstrated, the Barnette decision's curtailment of the police power 5 of the
states was a drastic change in the law.
The precise issue addressed in both decisions was whether state legisla-
tures were barred from providing compulsory school activities designed to
foster patriotism and feelings of national unity.6 In Gobitis, the Court de-
3. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Two children were expelled from the public school for refusing to
pledge allegiance to the flag as required by the Board of Education of Minersville, Pennsyl-
vania. The children, Jehovah's Witnesses, had been taught to believe that the Bible, as the
word of God, is the supreme authority and that it forbids as idolatry saluting the flag. Id. at
591-92.
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Following Gobitis, the West Virginia State Board of Education
adopted a resolution ordering all students and teachers to participate in the flag salute as part of
the regular program of educational activities. Failure to conform was considered to be insubor-
dination and the child was expelled until she agreed to comply. The student was also threatened
with delinquency proceedings aimed at sending the child to reformatory. The parents could also
be prosecuted, with conviction resulting in a fine and jail term. Id. at 626-29. The plaintiffs in
Barnette sought to enjoin enforcement of the resolution against Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 629.
5. "Police power" is defined as "the power vested in a state to establish laws and ordi-
nances for the regulation and enforcement of its police as above defined." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1317 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). "Police" is defined as "the function of that branch of the
administrative machinery of government which is charged with the preservation of public order
and tranquility, the promotion of the public health, safety, and morals. ... Id. at 1316.
6. The difference in attitude and perspective between the Gobitis and Barnette Courts is
vividly apparent when the stated issues in each decision are contrasted. In Gobitis, the Court
formulated the issue as follows:
[Wihether the legislatures of the various states and the authorities in a thousand
counties and school districts of this country are barred from determining the ap-
propriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment [which is the ap-
preciation of our nation's hopes and dreams, sufferings and sacrifices] without which
there ultimately can be no liberties, civil or religious.
[Vol. 28:387
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ferred entirely to the judgment of legislators and educators in selecting the
methods by which to shape children's minds. 7 In Barnette, recognizing that
this deference must have some limitation, the Court held that the minimal
extent of this limitation is defined by the Bill of Rights and that the courts
are the appropriate agency to apply the legal principles encompassed
therein. 8
Both the language and the timing 9 of the Barnette opinion indicate that
the decision was promoted not as much by concern for the right of indi-
vidual school children to follow their religious convictions, as for the right of
the American people to remain free from totalitarianism. 10 However, the
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597 (1940). In Barnette, however, the
Court found that "[t]he sole conflict is between authority and the rights of the individuals,"
West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943), and focused on whether "this
slow and easily neglected route [of instruction in history and civil liberty which will inspire
patriotism and love of country] to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by sub-
stituting a compulsory salute and slogan." Id. at 631.
7. The Court declined to serve as the nation's school board and refused to debate issues of
educational policy, noting only that the patriotic ends sought to be attained by the resolution
were legitimate and thus justified the means, even if those means were harsh, foolish, or uncer-
tain. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940). The state's power in this
area was considered virtually plenary. It was assumed by the Court that the state possessed the
general power to enforce such rules; the only issue was whether an exception would be allow-
able for certain religious groups. Id. at 594-95, 597.
8. Id. at 636-39, 641-42. The protections of the Fourteenth Amendment were specifically
extended to boards of education in order to ensure that they exercise their largely discretionary
authority within constitutional limitations. Whereas the Gobitis Court deferred to the adminis-
trative and educational judgment of the board, the Barnette Court sanctioned judicial review
over boards of education precisely because of their educational functions. The Board's function
in "educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth
to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." Id. at 637.
9. See generally W. KIRCHNER, WESTERN CIVILIZAnON SINCE 1500, 284-99 (1966). World
War II began in 1939 and lasted until 1945. Hitler's dictatorship in Nazi Germany provided
horrifying examples of fascist ideals brought to their logical extreme. With the state as the
ultimate judge of right and wrong, civil liberties were curtailed and strict censorship was im-
posed to suppress anti-government opinion. National allegiance and pride gave way to
chauvinism, which later resulted in the extermination of millions of people. Id. at 284-85, 287.
10. A significant portion of the opinion was devoted to warning of the perils of enforced
patriotism. The Parent and Teacher Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, and the Red Cross
had objected to the salute as being "too much like Hitler's." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1943). Phrases such as "[i]f official power exists to coerce acceptance of
any patriotic creed . . . ," id. at 633-34, indicate the Court's concern for potential abuse of
power by the government. The Court stressed, however, that enforcing constitutionally man-
dated limitations on the police power of the states would not result in a weakened government.
Id. at 636-37.
Granting the states the right to determine the method to instill national pride seemed harm-
less to the Gobitis Court in 1940. In 1943, however, upholding the imposition of harsh penalties
for non-compliance with those methods could no longer be considered innocuous. See note 4
supra. Not content merely to hint at the actual purpose of the opinion, the Court concluded by
stating:
As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its ac-
complishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. . . . Ultimate futility of
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chief importance of Barnette was its establishment of some level of judicial
scrutiny"' for the review of legislation alleged to infringe upon the First
such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort. . . . Down to
the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. . . . Compulsory unifica-
tion of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. . . . If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by words or act their faith therein.
Id. at 640-42.
11. Until recently, the Supreme Court has been very reluctant to rule on the constitutional-
ity of state statutes. One evasive measure employed to this end by the Court has been termed
the "Rule of Reasonableness." Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a Viable Theory
of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 153, 154-60 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Rule of Reasonableness]. Under a Rule of Reasonableness analysis, there is a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality which is overcome only when the violation is proved beyond a reason-
able doubt and there is no "rational basis" for the statute (i.e., no rational relation between the
statute and some "valid" state interest). Id. at 156. Because its use has consistently meant
finding the statute to be constitutionally valid, this test has been characterized as "minimal
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact . . . [sic] the 'mere rationality' requirement sym-
bolizes virtual judicial abdication." Id. at 165, quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8, 19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Newer Equal Protec-
tion]. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
The Warren Court developed, in the area of equal protection, a two-tiered approach of
"selective intervention," in which cases involving a fundamental interest or a suspect classifica-
tion would be strictly scrutinized to determine whether the statute was related to a "compel-
ling" state interest. The application of strict scrutiny has generally proven fatal to the statute in
question. Shaman, Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right To Marry and Have Chil-
dren, 11 Fnm. L.Q. 61, 66-67 (Spring 1978) [hereinafter cited as Persons Who Are Mentally
Retarded]; Rule of Reasonableness, supra at 164-65; Newer Equal Protection, supra at 8. See,
e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to interstate travel); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy in matters of procreation); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (equal protection in voting apportionment); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(freedom of speech). In all other cases, however, the Rule of Reasonableness still was to be
applied. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (social welfare legislation); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning ordinance); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (landlord/tenant -statutory eviction procedures). See generally Shapiro v. Williams, 394
U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Burger Court has broken down this two-tiered approach into a multi-level system in
which the level of scrutiny varies according to the right being litigated. Under these inter-
mediate levels of scrutiny, the purpose and effect of the statute are examined by the courts, but
with recognition of the state's broad police powers. See note 5 supra. Intermediate scrutiny has
required finding that the statute be "significantly related" to a "significant" or "appropriate"
state interest. Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded, supra at 67; Newer Equal Protection, supra
at 17. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (school picketing); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimate children). Intermediate scrutiny appears to
be similar to the model proposed by Professor Shaman in which the Supreme Court should "in
all instances engage in a complete and realistic balancing of interests-a weighing of legislative
purpose against individual rights .... " under which the courts would look to the relationship
between the statute and its purpose only if the balancing of interests favored the legislative
purpose. Rule of Reasonableness, supra at 174. Although these levels of scrutiny were de-
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Amendment freedoms of children. The level of scrutiny used by the Court
in Barnette was characterized by a balancing of the state's police power and
the individual's interest in matters as fundamental as freedom of worship,
speech, and political opinion.
1 2
This approach was followed again in 1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts, 13
although this time the Court ultimately concluded that the state's broad au-
thority over children and its strong interest in protecting them justified cer-
tain limitations on private First Amendment rights.1 4 In Prince, the Court
began to formulate the factors and standards which would be applied in fu-
ture decisions where a stricter level of scrutiny was to be found appro-
priate. 1 5  It recognized that one of the liberties at stake was the child-
veloped in the area of equal protection, they provide valuable tools for analyzing the Court's
decisions in other areas as well.
12. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
13. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
14. Prince, like Barnette, presented the issue of a child's right to freedom of religious prac-
tice. Mrs. Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted of violating Massachusetts' child labor
laws, which prohibited children from selling newspapers, periodicals, etc., in any street or
public place. Betty Simmons, a nine year old Jehovah's Witness over whom Mrs. Prince had
legal custody, distributed copies of Watchtower and engaged in preaching work on city
sidewalks each week with Mrs. Prince. Both testified that they were ordained ministers and
Betty believed it was her religious duty to perform this work and that "failure would bring
condemnation 'to everlasting destruction at Armageddon."' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 163 (1944).
However, absent the sensitive issue of enforced patriotism, the Court felt comfortable with
the application of minimal scrutiny: although no evidence of harm to the child -either actual or
potential-was presented, the Court found that the state interest in safeguarding children from
abuses was sufficient to sustain the statute in question. Id. at 170. Justice Murphy, in a dissent-
ing opinion, chastized the majority for accepting the asserted state interest in protecting its
children from the harmful "diverse influences of the street" without proof that any grave, im-
mediate and substantial harm was likely to emanate from the distribution of religious literature
by minors under the direct supervision of an adult. He noted that it was equally likely that such
experiences would be beneficial since "[glambling, truancy, irregular eating and sleeping habits,
and the more serious vices are not consistent with the high moral character ordinarily displayed
by children fulfilling religious obligations." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 174-75 (1944)
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
Even allowing for some dilution of the standard of review because of the state's broader
authority to protect children, the standard applied in Prince fell far short of the standard the
Court had consistently applied for adults. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63
(1941), where the Court examined the First Amendment "clear and present danger" cases and
extracted from them the principle that the harm sought to be averted by the statute must be
"extremely serious" and the "degree of imminence extremely high" before expression can be
punished. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
15. In its recognition of the state's authority to protect children from certain dangers, the
Court named the "crippling effects of child employment" and harms arising from exposure to
"all the diverse influences of the street" as being particularly appropriate for exercise of the
state's police power. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944). This has since been
fashioned into a standard akin to the "clear and present danger" test. See Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). See also notes 34-41 and
accompanying text infra. However, such a development would have to wait for the application
of stricter scrutiny. See notes 21, 42-44 and text accompanying notes 19-22, 32-48 infra.
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petitioner's freedom to observe the tenets and practices of her faith. This
freedom, as well as others ensured by the First Amendment, occupies a
preferred position among rights protected by the Constitution.16 The Court
expressly limited Prince to its facts 17 so that the decision would not be
viewed as precedent for allowing "every 'state intervention in the indoctrina-
tion and participation of children in religion' which may be done 'in the
name of their health and welfare'." 18 Perhaps because of this limitation,
Prince was to become the foundation for the protection of children's rights
from state intervention.
The turning point in the Court's attitude toward children occurred in
Brown v. Board of Education. 19 In this case, the rights of children and the
state's duty to protect those rights were the focal points. 20  For the first
time, the Court strictly scrutinized the effect of a law on the constitutional
rights of children.21 After a careful examination of the impact of the school
segregation laws, the Court held that equal protection had been denied the
student-petitioners. 22
B. The Tinker Era
It would appear to be a natural progression to extend the Fourteenth
Amendment protections of Brown to other constitutional rights of children.
16. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164, 167 (1944).
17. Id. at 171.
18. Id.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, black students of both elementary and high school age
challenged state laws and constitutions which allowed or required segregated public schools.
The Court held that such segregation denied the black students equal educational opportunities,
even though the physical plants and other tangible factors may have been equal.
20. For example, the Court defined the minimal extent of the state's duty when it held that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.... Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493. With regard to the rights of children, the Court
found that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
• . . [S]egregation in public education . . . is a denial of equal protection of the laws." Id. at
495.
21. Under strict scrutiny, the state is required to show actual evidence of the harms from
which it seeks to protect children or actual evidence of the necessity for the regulations im-
posed. The use of strict scrutiny in Brown was, of course, prompted by the racial issue. See
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488-92 (1954), where the Court recounted the histori-
cal background and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also must be noted that the use
of strict scrutiny in Brown is apparent only from looking to what the Court did rather than to
what it said; nowhere in the opinion did the Court use the language that generally signals the
use of strict scrutiny. See note 11 supra. The Court, instead, expressly focused its attention on
the effect of segregation on public education (i.e., on the school children themselves) in its
determination of the constitutional question, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492
(1954), indicating its position by framing the issue in these terms: "Does segregation of children
in public school solely on the basis of race . . . deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities?" Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 493-95. However, it should be noted that discriminatory impact alone will not
render a statute or practice unconstitutional. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
[Vol. 28:387
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However, this step was not taken for thirteen years. Finally, between 1967
and 1969, three major Supreme Court decisions were rendered regarding
the constitutional rights of minors.2 3 These decisions used Brown's strict
scrutiny approach to review alleged state violations of First and Fifth
Amendment rights of children.
The first of these decisions, In re Gault,24 employed strict scrutiny 25 and
held that juveniles were entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protec-
tions in juvenile proceedings even in the face of the state's contention that
such proceedings were of a civil rather than criminal nature.2 6 However,
the second decision, Ginsberg v. New York, 27 appeared to retreat from the
trend of expanding children's rights and freedoms. The Ginsberg Court
employed the rational relation test associated with minimal scrutiny 28 and
upheld a New York statute which prohibited the sale of obscene materials to
a minor under seventeen. 29 On a closer examination of the Court's reason-
ing, though, it becomes apparent that the use of this approach was due to
the presence of the obscenity issue, rather than a move to restrict the ex-
pansion of children's constitutional freedoms. Although the case could have
been disposed of fairly simply on the basis of the wide latitude accorded the
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gerald Gault, fifteen, was taken into custody after a complaint was
made alleging that he had made lewd telephone calls. Following hearings in juvenile court, he
was committed to the State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent. There was no semblance
of due process in the Gault case: neither Gault nor his parents were given notice of the charges;
he was denied the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his complainant; he was not ad-
vised of his right to retain counsel and no counsel was appointed for him; he was not advised of
his right to refrain from self-incrimination; no transcript was made of the juvenile court proceed-
ings; and no appeal was permitted from the juvenile court case. In holding (or implying, in the
case of the last two rights) that all of these safeguards must be made available to children in
juvenile court proceedings, the Court stated that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 28.
25. Id. at 21-22, 24-25, 30. After exploring the historical development of the juvenile justice
system as a "civil" system, id. at 14-27, the Court found that, euphemisms aside, the penalty
imposed in Gault was incarceration in a state institution for a term of years where the child
would be surrounded by guards and "delinquents" who might range from "wayward children" to
rapists and murderers. Id. at 27-28. The Court concluded that such a system must be required
to employ the "procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due pro-
cess"' in the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency proceeding. Id. at 27-28, 30-31.
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28, 30-31 (1967).
27. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
28. See note 11 supra.
29. The owner of a stationery store was convicted of selling pornographic magazines to a
sixteen year old boy in violation of a New York statute forbidding the sale to a minor under
seventeen of "any picture which depicts nudity ... and which is harmful to minors" or any
magazine containing such pictures which "taken as a whole, [are] harmful to minors." Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968). It was unquestioned that the materials involved would
not be obscene if sold to an adult. The appellant did not assert that the materials were not
harmful to minors within the definition of the statute. Rather, he attacked the power of the
state to adopt a variable concept of obscenity which would be dependent on the age of the
audience. Id. at 636.
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state in regulating obscenity, 30 the Court made a detailed analysis of the
interest asserted by the state to justify a different standard of obscenity for
children. 3 1 The result of this analysis was the application of the rational
relation test. However, the tenor of the opinion, as well as the presence of
this type of analysis, indicates that the Court was particularly interested in
the protection of children's rights. Thus, the opinion suggests ,that more
rigorous scrutiny would still be used in the determination of issues concern-
ing the constitutional rights of children.
This evaluation of the Court's approach in Ginsberg is affirmed by the
strong language of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District.32 Tinker firmly established the courts as agents for securing the
constitutional rights of children in their capacity as students. 33 The Court
adopted without revision 34 the "material and substantial interference" test
30. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-76 (1966); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1943), was heavily relied upon as authority
for the state's power to protect the well-being of its children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 630, 638-39 (1968). The right of parents to exercise primary authority in the care and
up-bringing of their children was also viewed as being particularly important in the assessment
of whether the state could impose limitations on the availability of sex-related materials to
minors. Id. at 639.
32. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the "black armband" case, three public school students
of junior high and high school age were suspended for wearing black armbands to protest the
government's Vietnam policy. Although the students knew that school policy prohibited the
wearing of armbands to school, there was no indication of any disruption of school activities and
the protest was passive and did not infringe on the rights of other students. Only a few of the
18,000 students in the school system wore armbands and only five were suspended. The school
order did not seek to prohibit the wearing of all symbols -students were allowed to wear
national campaign buttons and Iron Crosses (a traditional symbol of Nazism).
33. Beginning with the powerful "[it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," id.
at 506, the Court stressed that this "has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost
50 years," and cited to a long line of cases which have established that the state cannot impose
conditions upon attendance or employment at public schools which are in violation of funda-
mental constitutional rights. Id. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (an Arkansas
public school teacher successfully challenged a statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution as a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (statute requiring loyalty oath of state university faculty members certifying
that they are not Communists); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (official state prayer re-
quired to be recited in public schools); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring
each teacher to file an annual listing of every organization to which he or she had belonged or
contributed); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (statute prohibiting employment
of "subversive persons" by any public educational institution); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (statute requiring school children to salute the flag and pledge of
allegiance); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (requiring children to be educated
at public schools).
34. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 513
(1969). This test provides that "where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden [speech and expression] would 'materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,"' the regulation violates the
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formulated by the Fifth Circuit 3 5 for determining the validity of restrictions
on student speech and expression. In practical effect, this test is equivalent
to the clear and present danger test,36 tempered by time, manner, and place
restrictions. 3 7  One of the cornerstones of the clear and present danger test
is that the circumstances of the expression are critical in determining
whether the speech poses a danger.38 The school or classroom setting does
First Amendment rights of the students. Id., quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966).
35. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). Burnside presented facts similar to
Tinker. The Fifth Circuit held that the wearing of "freedom buttons" inscribed with the word-
ing, "'One Man One Vote," could not be prohibited except in accordance with the standards set
out by the court.
The district court which upheld the constitutionality of the school policy in Tinker referred to
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Burnside, but expressly declined to follow it, finding instead that
school officials must be given wide latitude to forestall any disturbance. Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
36. The Court has long recognized that certain types of speech may be prohibited under a
state's police powers. However, great care must be taken to ensure that speech is not curtailed
because the state officials do not agree with its content. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187-88 (1972), quoting Communist Party v. SACB, 367
U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964).
The clear and present danger test was first developed in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919), as a guide for determining which types of speech could properly and constitutionally
be made subject to prior restraints. The test was perhaps best characterized in that case:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all
that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done
• ..The most stringent protection of freedom of speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that might have all the effect of force ...
The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.
Id. at 52. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The clear and present danger
test was subsequently modified to require that such speech be "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present Danger Test:
Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60, 69-70 (1976).
37. Thus, it is the same test, with the same restrictions, as is applied in the review of adult
freedom of expression. Although the states may not censor speech on the basis of its content,
see note 36 supra, they may make reasonable regulations respecting the time, place and/or
manner of speech. These restrictions may not be applied in a discriminatory manner, and they
may not operate to totally eliminate a recognized First Amendment forum. See Crayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1972); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
38. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S.
194, 205, 206 (1904). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), in which the Court distin-
guished between "the mere abstract teaching" of criminal syndicalism and "preparing a group
for violent action and steeling it to such action." Id. at 448, quoting Noto v. United States, 367
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nothing more to alter this constitutional right than to provide the cir-
cumstances which act as a backdrop against which the right must be mea-
sured. Similarly, the "danger" against which the states are empowered to
protect their citizens may vary according to the circumstances.3 9 However,
under the Tinker test neither the state's disapproval of the content of the
speech nor an undifferentiated fear of disturbance is enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression. 40 Again, this rationale parallels the approach
used by the Court in discussing the First Amendment rights of adults. 4 1
Tinker presented a clear use of strict scrutiny. 42  This was the first time
that this standard of review was explicitly used in the determination of a
children's rights issue.43 In so doing, the Court summarily rejected the
asserted state interest in the prevention of any disturbances in the school as
insufficient to contravene the constitutional mandate for freedom of
U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (the situation was
characterized as "a far cry from Feiner" and thus remained protected); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (speech ceases to be protected when a speaker "passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308-11 (1940) (the state has the power to punish speech which "exhorts others to physical
attack" or which creates an immediate danger to the public safety).
39. For adults in an open First Amendment forum, the danger is usually of physical vio-
lence to persons present. For children in public schools, the danger is of material disruption of
the educational process, although imminent danger of physical violence also would be sufficient
to justify restrictions on students' speech.
40. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 511
(1969).
41. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
42. The Court recognized that students are "persons" under the Constitution and have fun-
damental rights which must be respected by the states. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 511 (1969). Strict scrutiny has traditionally been
applied in cases involving (adult) rights which have been characterized as being "fundamental."
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
The Court cited with approval the Barnette Court's recognition of the need for "scrupulous
protection" of the constitutional rights of students, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969), quoting West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The Tinker Court then applied that level of protection to the classroom
context:
The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to
free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit
reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted cir-
cunstances. But we do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment
rights .. . to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (em-
phasis added). Elsewhere, the Court stated that "[i]n the absence of a specific showing of con-
stitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expres-
sion of their views." Id. at 511 (emphasis added). School authorities are not permitted to restrict
student expression merely because the sentiments so expressed do not have official blessing. Id.
43. The effect of the discussion in Brown was the application of strict scrutiny, but nowhere
in the opinion did the Court expressly state its intent to use this test when determining ques-
tions regarding children's rights. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
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speech.44 School authorities again 45 were told that they must exercise their
authority within the limitations of the Bill of Rights. 46  Thus, the Court
applied the same compelling state interest test in Tinker as it had used in
adult First Amendment cases. 4 7  Consequently, this case provides a strong




The Gault-Ginsberg-Tinker trilogy clearly announced that constitutional
rights and freedoms apply to minors, and that the courts are the appropriate
forum for their vindication. In Gault and Tinker, the Court applied strict
scrutiny. In Ginsberg the scrutiny was more rigorous than that utilized in
cases involving obscenity statutes. The pendulum, however, now appears to
be swinging back, perhaps in reaction to the strong stance taken by the
Court in these three cases. More recent cases dealing with children's rights
indicate that the Burger Court may be attempting to limit constitutional pro-
tections in this area.4 9 For example, in both Planned Parenthood of Mis-
44. Strict scrutiny necessarily requires a showing of a compelling state interest. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Persons Who
Are Mentally Retarded, supra note 11, at 66. In Tinker, however, the school failed to establish
a compelling interest to be achieved by the armband prohibition. There was no evidence that
school officials anticipated any major disturbances as a result of the armbands. The official
memorandum which listed the reasons for the ban did not refer to fear of disruption and trial
testimony indicated that it was, in fact, the "principle of the demonstration" itself that provided
the impetus for the regulation. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 509 n.3 (1969).
Of even greater concern to the Court was the school's use of a ban on symbolic speech in a
selective manner so as to prohibit only expression relating to the United States involvement in
Vietnam. Id. at 510-11. Such selectivity made it eminently clear that the regulation was put into
operation to stem expression solely on the basis of its content. This has not been constitutionally
permissible with regard to adult speech. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also note 36
supra. Tinker extended this protection to minors as well. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
45. See note 8 and text accompanying notes 4-12 supra.
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 513,
514 (1969). Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, reiterated the principle that the "classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,"' id. at 512, quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1966), and that the "vigilant protection of constitutional freedom . . . is . . . vital
in . . . American schools." Id., quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
47. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
48. Ironically, Mary Beth Tinker, one of the participants in the armband demonstration,
does not see the decision as being of major significance. Six years after the ruling she told a
newspaper reporter that she didn't believe it "had any sweeping consequences" and felt that it
"mainly has been applied to defend students who defied school dress codes." What Happened
to Mary Beth?, 4 INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES NEWSLETTER 5 (1977), quoting The
Des Moines Sunday Register.
49. This is indicative of the Burger Court's restrictions of personal liberties in general. See
generally Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. LOUIS L.J. 211 (1977); Comment,
Civil Rights in the Burger Court Era, 10 AKRON L. REv. 327 (1976).
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souri v. Danforth 5o and Carey v. Population Services, International, 51 the
Court retreated to an intermediate scrutiny/significant state interest posi-
tion. 52 Although in Danforth it was acknowledged that minors have constitu-
tional rights, 53 these later decisions illustrate the Court's position that the
very fact of the state's broader authority to regulate children's activities war-
rants application of the less stringent test. 54
In Danforth,55 the statutory requirement of parental consent for minors'
abortions was held to be unconstitutional even under intermediate scrutiny
because it imposed an absolute limitation on the rights of minors without
sufficient justification. 56 However, it was emphasized in dicta in both Dan-
forth and its companion case 57 that the state's broad authority to regulate
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See notes 55-58 and accompanying text infra.
51. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See note 59 infra.
52. The Danforth Court stated that "[t]he Court ... long has recognized that the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children ... It remains, then, to
examine whether there is any significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of an
adult." Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (citations omitted). It
is this emphasis on the priority of the state's interest, coupled with the use of the significant
state interest test, which signals the retreat to a less strict level of scrutiny. The requirement of
a "significant state interest" to justify infringement on an individual right is usually associated
with a considerably lower level of scrutiny than the requirement of a "compelling state in-
terest." See note 11 supra.
53. The Court recognized that "constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority." Planned Parenthood of Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967). See also notes 24, 33, 42, 44, 46, and text accompanying notes 24-26, 33, and 40-48 supra.
54. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976).
55. This was a suit brought by two physicians and a not-for-profit corporation to challenge a
Missouri abortion statute which, inter alia, required that before obtaining an abortion during
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen must have
the written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis, unless a licensed physician certified
that the abortion was necessary to save the mother's life. The Court held that the state did not
have the authority to impose such a blanket provision and that the significant state interest test
was not met by the asserted interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental authority. Id.
at 74-75. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (companion case).
56. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). The Court felt that
the reasoning which had been applied earlier in the decision with regard to adult married
women should be used here as well. Id.
57. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Bellotti, decided on the same day as Danforth,
involved a Massachusetts statute which required the consent of the mother and her parents if
the mother was unmarried and under eighteen, with the additional proviso that if the parents
refused consent, it might be obtained by court order upon a showing of good cause. Id. at
134-35. The statute had not yet been interpreted by the Massachusetts courts. The appellants,
the officials charged with the enforcement of the statute, urged an interpretation which would
permit a child determined by the court to be mature enough to give informed consent, to be
able to do so without requiring parental consent. Id. at 144. The Court abstained from ruling on
the constitutionality of the statute, finding it to be susceptible of such a construction which
would create a preference for parental consultation without giving a minor's parents absolute
veto power. Id. at 145, 146-47, 148.
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the activities of minors might justify some restrictions. 58  The use of inter-
mediate scrutiny in such situations was justified by the Court in the plurality
opinion of Carey 59 where it stated:
This test is apparently less rigorous than the "compelling state interest" test
applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults .... Such lesser
scrutiny is appropriate both because of the States' greater latitude to
regulate the conduct of children ...and because the right of privacy im-
plicated here is "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions" .... and the law has generally regarded minors as
having a lesser capability for making important decisions ... 60
While the aforementioned cases dealt with privacy issues, if read together
with the Burger Court's trend toward restricting judicial protection of per-
sonal liberties, 6 1 they appear to portend a general application of inter-
mediate scrutiny to all children's rights cases. This use of the significant state
interest test for review of restrictions on decisional privacy was justified by
the Court in Danforth and Carey because children are less capable than
58. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Danforth Court em-
phasized that its holding did not mean that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, could
give effective consent. Id. at 75. In Bellotti, the Court merely required that state regulations
not "unduly burden" the right to seek an abortion. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
The Court, however, declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute before the Mas-
sachusetts Judicial Court had rendered its interpretation of the statutory requirements. In doing
so, Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, expressed the hope that the Mas-
sachusetts court would consider at least those factors used by the Supreme Court in Danforth.
He further urged that the statute not be interpreted to require a parental veto, ignore the best
interests of the minor, or impose burdens upon a minor capable of giving informed consent. Id.
at 147, 151. The opinion thus indicated that, although a statutory requirement for consent might
be found constitutional, an intermediate level of scrutiny would be applied in making that de-
termination.
59. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). But see note 67 infra. Carey was
a suit brought by distributors of contraceptives to challenge the constitutionality of a New York
statute which, inter alia, prohibited distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to any person
under sixteen, except by a physician in the course of his/her practice. The asserted interest in
discouraging sexual activity in minors by increasing the hazards of such activity was rejected
because there was no evidence of a deterrent effect. In addition, considerable evidence was
introduced to indicate that no such effect existed. Id. at 695-96. Arguing from Danforth, the
Court concluded that the "constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of con-
traceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed" since the state interest in the minors' health is
"clearly more implicated by the abortion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous
contraceptive." Id. at 694. Distribution by physicians was also insufficient to save the statute.
Id. at 697-99.
60. Id. at 693 n.15. But it is clear that intermediate scrutiny was employed in Carey. Al-
though in footnote 15 strict scrutiny was expressly rejected, the Court also rejected minimal
scrutiny when it reaffirmed
the principle that when a State, as here, burdens the exercise of a fundamental
right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational means for the accomplishment
of some significant State policy requires more than a bare assertion, based on a
conceded absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to such a
policy.
Id. at 696.
61. See note 49 supra.
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adults of making important decisions. 62  One may argue that the restrictions
allowed on decisional privacy also can be justified in the area of speech,
where a similar level of maturity is required for appropriate decision-
making. 63 But such an extension would signal an erosion of the constitu-
tional protection given to minors in previous decisions. 6 4 Moreover, it
should be noted that any extension of the significant state interest test
beyond the privacy area would not only be without precedent but also would
be unnecessary. This is so because First Amendment questions have tradi-
tionally invoked the strictest scrutiny, 65 whereas privacy issues have not con-
sistently been given this protection. 66  It is possible, therefore, that Carey
will not be seen as a limitation on Tinker. 67
62. See notes 58, 60, and accompanying text supra.
63. Important decisions are involved in the speech area-decisions about what to print or
say, about the credence to be given to what is read or heard, about whether to respond to the
expression and about what form that response should take.
64. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); West Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
65. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
66. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 985 (1976). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497 (1972);
and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where in each case the Court has more strictly
scrutinized privacy issues.
67. Carey's precedential value on this point is limited. The opinion presents a confusing
web of concurrences for each of its five sections. Section IV, regarding minors' rights, was
written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice
White concurred in the result because the states failed to demonstrate that the prohibition
actually deterred premarital sexual activity. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702
(1977). Justice Powell stated that there is "no justification for subjecting restrictions on the
sexual activity of the young to heightened judicial review," id. at 705, but found the statute
invalid because it interfered with parental guidance and authority. Id. at 708. Justice Stevens
found that the state had a significant interest in discouraging sexual activity among minors, but
concluded that the statute was invalid as a form of propaganda. Id. at 714-16.
In two recent cases involving children's rights, the Court has takes opposite positions with
regard to whether the level of scrutiny to be applied should be less because the case involved
minors. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), after holding that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to disciplinary corporal punishment
in public schools, the Court found that virtually no procedural due process was required for the
application of "reasonable corporal punishment in school" becausestate laws allowing it "repre-
sent . . . 'the balance struck by this country,' . . . between the child's interest in personal
securitv and the traditional view that some corporal punishment may be necessary in the course
of a child's education." Id. at 1415. This use of minimal scrutiny was thought to be justified
because of the availability of civil and criminal penalties for "unnecessarily 'severe"' corporal
punishment, and because the "uncontradicted evidence suggest[ed] that the . .. punishment
• . . was, 'with the exception of a few cases, ... unremarkable in physical severity."' Id. at
1416.
At the other extreme, in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), the Court applied adult
standards when finding that students temporarily suspended from school without due process
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The Court need not extend the application of the significant state interest
test to the resolution of non-privacy constitutional issues regarding minors. It
is not a contradiction to employ the compelling state interest test while rec-
ognizing that the states have wide latitude in regulating the activities of chil-
dren. An interest ;vhich would be compelling where children are involved
might not be when applied to adults. 68 The Court should not be reluctant
to apply strict scrutiny on behalf of children-it would not mean that the
states would be deprived of the power to protect children, only that they
would have to exercise that power within the bounds of the Constitution.
This has always been considered a reasonable and warranted restraint on the
states' sovereign powers in the determination of questions of adults' constitu-
tional rights. It is no less reasonable when the citizen whose rights are at
issue happens to be below the age of majority.
II. THEORY IN APPLICATION: FEDERAL COURTS
EXAMINE HIGH SCHOOL PRIOR RESTRAINT REGULATIONS
Most First Amendment issues regarding children's rights have arisen in
the context of the educational process. 69 Since children spend such a great
deal of their time in school, their classmates, teachers, and school adminis-
trators are most likely to be the targets of children's expression. To restrict
would be able to collect damages from the school board. The Court did not expressly state the
standard of review used in this case but went through a detailed analysis of the applicable
(adult) tort law of damages. There was no indication that the case was decided any differently
than if the plaintiffs had been adults. It must be remembered that the Court's justification for
its result in Ingraham was that civil remedies were available to students whose constitutional
rights may have been violated by the schools. However, the civil remedy can only be pursued if
a recognized right has been violated. These cases indicate that the Court is still using a case-
by-case approach for children's rights issues and has not yet committed itself to the use of the
significant state interest test in all circumstances.
68. For example, a student's expression may be limited in order to avoid material disruption
of school discipline, whereas an adult's expression is limited only by the clear and present
danger test. See note 36 supra. The latter test allows a greater degree of excitement and dissent
to be created by the speech.
69. For discussion and cases on other First Amendment issues regarding minors, see
Keenan, Current Issues in Illinois School Law: The Consumer's Perspective, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 402, 416-20 (1973); Note, Constitutional Law -First Amendment-Free Exercise
Clause -Schools and School Districts, 13 DUQ. L. REV. 611 (1975); Note, Students' Constitu-
tional Rights in Public Secondary Education, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 110-14 (1975).
The First Amendment was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment in Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927). See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
102-03 (1971). Since boards of education, whether state, county or local, are arms of the state
and derive their authority from the state, they may not promulgate regulations or adopt policies
which are violative of the First Amendment rights of students, teachers, or administrators. 68
AM. JUR. 2d Schools § 14 (1973). This, of course, applies only to public educational facilities;
students attending private schools cannot seek legal enforcement of their First Amendment
rights as against such institutions. However, many private schools voluntarily recognize these
rights. See MANUAL FOR STUDENT EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE
HIGH SCHOOL PRESS 9-10 (1976). This manual may be obtained from the Student Press Law
Center. See note 164 infra. See also Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1056-64 (1968).
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children's expression to non-school forums would be to deny them meaning-
ful communication. For adults, the presence of adequate alternative avenues
of communication must be shown before access to a particular forum can be
denied .70 There is no reason why this theory should not be applied to
children's expression as well. Accordingly, if children are to have First
Amendment freedoms, these freedoms must be protected in the school envi-
ronment.
The federal courts, armed with the strict scrutiny of the Gault-Ginsberg-
Tinker trilogy and a strong policy for protection of academic freedom and
inquiry, 7 1 have developed a body of law designed to secure the classroom
and school grounds as a First Amendment forum. Although this policy was
formed in cases involving teachers' rights, the language of those decisions
explicitly extends their application to students.
In one of the most significant of the teachers' rights cases, Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 72 the Court designated the classroom as "peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas"' 73 in which students should be allowed to develop
positions of their own. However, realization of this goal requires vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms in the public schools. 74  As in other
First Amendment forums, certain overriding state interests must be recog-
nized, but judicial intervention has been mandated when regulations
adopted in furtherance of such state interests directly implicate and con-
travene basic constitutional values.
75
70. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972). The Court relied in part on the
availability of "adequate alternative avenues of communication" to hold that owners of private
shopping malls could adopt regulations forbidding handbilling on mall premises without viola-
tion of the First Amendment. See also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)
(employer may prohibit non-employee distribution of union literature on his/her premises if the
union can reach the employees by reasonable efforts through other available channels of com-
munication).
71. But see notes 137-62 and accompanying text infra, in which the Second Circuit applied
minimal scrutiny.
72. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
73. Id. at 603. Reasoning that the goal of producing generations of informed, thinking citi-
zens can be met only by allowing students to explore diverse views and positions, the Court
stated that "[tihe Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id., quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). This premise had been recognized in cases prior to
Keyishian as well. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), in which it was noted that
"teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate." Id. at
487, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1956).
74. The Court has recognized this need. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), the Court explicitly stated its policy to afford such protection: "Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendental value to all of us ....
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Id. at 603.
75. With regard to student freedoms, the courts have recognized that state and local school
boards must retain control over the daily operation of the schools and the educational process.
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
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Student newspapers 76 are the primary means by which students express
their views, suggestions, and criticisms. Not surprisingly, these papers often
have been the target of suppression and censorship by school administrators.
Although this has taken the form of both prior restraints and post-publication
penalties, 77 this Comment will examine only those issues raised by school
regulations which impose prior restraints on student publications.
A. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to forbid fed-
eral, state, and local governments from imposing any system of prior re-
straint, 78 with certain limited exceptions, on speech protected by the First
Amendment. 79  The prior restraint doctrine is much more stringent than
(1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923). See also Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), in which the Court abdicated in favor of local control of
school policy. See notes 3-8 and accompanying text supra.
76. Student publications include both school-supported and underground newspapers. The
interests which must be balanced against the students' rights to free expression vary depending
on which type of publication is involved. If the newspaper is financed in whole or substantial
part by the school or is operated in conjunction with a regular academic program (e.g., a jour-
nalism class for which participating students receive academic credit), the school administrators
might assert a legitimate interest in the format, educational goals to be achieved, and/or types of
articles to be included. See generally COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HIGH SCHOOL JOUR-
NALISM, CAPTIVE VOICES: HIGH SCHOOL JOURNALISM IN AMERICA 25-49 (1974). In contrast,
where underground papers are involved, administrators' concerns properly should extend only
to protecting the student audience from materials which are libelous, obscene, violence-
provoking, or which substantially disrupt normal school activity.
77. Post-publication penalties allow expression to take place but then impose a civil or crim-
inal sanction on the speaker. Examples include defamation actions and criminal prosecutions for
selling obscene materials or for violating valid time, place, and manner restrictions. Cases involv-
ing post-publication penalties turn upon a variety of factors, including the precise rules sought
to be imposed by the school administrators, notice of those rules to the students, whether the
publication had a materially disruptive effect on the student body and educational process, and
the severity of the punishment imposed. See, e.g., Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826; Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 333 F.
Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971), 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (The second Sullivan opinion
was on motion for an order for school officials to show cause why they should not be in con-
tempt of the permanent injunction issued in the first opinion, in addition to supplemental in-
junctive relief and damages involving the contempt. Only the supplemental relief was granted);
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
78. Prior restraints are official restrictions imposed on expression in advance of intended
publication which prevent the publication from occurring. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 643, 648-49, 655-58 (1965). The issue in prior restraint
cases generally concerns the constitutional validity of the method used to restrict the speech.
id.
79. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), established the prior restraint doctrine in this
country. The Court held that the chief purpose of the First Amendment guarantee of a free
press was to prevent prior restraints upon publication. Id. at 713. On this basis, the Court
found a statute to be unconstitutional because its operation and effect enjoined as a public
nuisance the publication of newspapers or periodicals determined to be "obscene, malicious or
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similar rules restricting post-publication punishments. 8 0 The reason is sim-
ple. The prior restraint of a certain form of publication, such as a specific
newspaper, will prevent both protected and unprotected speech. 81 On the
other hand, a post-publication penalty directed at the same paper ideally will
operate only against that expression which is not protected, or which may be
limited as to time, place, and manner under the First Amendment. Prior
restraints, in preventing communication from occurring at all, are in direct
conflict with the underlying First Amendment principle of assuring the exis-
tence of a "free marketplace of ideas," 82 no matter how unpopular or critical
those ideas may be.83
The combination of Tinker, holding that First Amendment principles of
free speech apply to public school students,8 4 and Near v. Minnesota, hold-
ing that those principles embody the right to distribute a publication without
scandalous." Id. at 712-13, 722-23. The Court, quoting Blackstone, established a policy protect-
ing the press from prior censorship: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of
a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published." Id. at 713, quoting 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151-52 (1769). The Court noted, though, that this protection is
not absolute. Id. at 716. Constitutionally permissible limitations on the prior restraint doctrine
have been developed most recently in the area of obscenity. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotors,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
80. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970).
81. The First Amendment does not expressly state that some speech will not be protected.
However, judicial interpretation of the amendment has added a gloss to this effect. Through the
use of legal fiction, the Court has determined that some words, symbols, etc. are not "speech"
protected by the First Amendment. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (profan-
ity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
82. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. The Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), noted that a "prior
restraint, by contrast to a post-publication penalty and by definition, has an immediate and
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Id. at 559. Justice Harlan,
dissenting in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964), previously had cautioned:
One danger of a censorship system is that the public may never be aware of what
an administrative agent refusesto permit to be published or distributed. A penal
sanction assures both that some overt thing has been done by the accused and that
the penalty is imposed for an activity that is not concealed from the public.
Id. at 223 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the primary issues to be considered when re-
viewing the constitutionality of a prior restraint rule are matters of administration, techniques of
enforcement, methods of operation, and the effect of these on the basic objectives of the First
Amendment. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1965).
Prior restraints of protected adult speech are unconstitutional per se. See note 79 supra.
However, prior restraints of certain types of adult speech and expression have been held not to
violate the First Amendment if specified procedural safeguards are utilized to ensure that only
those areas are being restrained. For example, obscenity is considered to be outside the protec-
tion of the Constitution. See note 81 supra. Therefore, statutes may prohibit the dissemination
of obscene materials as long as non-obscene materials are not also prohibited, and as long as due
process rights are afforded the would-be speaker. Southeastern Promotors, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546 (1975); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
84. See notes 42 and 44 supra.
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prior censorship, 85 should result in the application of the prior restraint doc-
trine to student publications. However, some appellate courts have indicated
that prior restraints on the student press may be constitutionally permissi-
ble,8 6 and the majority of circuits have refused to recognize the per se un-
constitutionality of such prior restraints.8 7 Only one case has expressly up-
held the prior restraint of student publications. 88
B. The Majority Position
The most extensive development of student prior restraint law has oc-
curred in the Fourth Circuit, where nearly one-third of such cases have
been litigated. 89 The moderate position taken by this circuit had its origin
in the rather tentative requirement that prior restraint rules must be jus-
tified by a reasonable belief in their necessity. This led to the development
of the current standard, which requires the strict application of most adult
prior restraint procedural safeguards in the high school setting.
The Fourth Circuit's first decision regarding prior restraint of student ex-
pression was Quarterman v. Byrd. 90 The case squarely analyzed the con-
85. See note 79 supra.
86. See, e.g., Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971), in which the First
Circuit struck down a junior high school's prior restraint rule which forbade the use of the
school facilities for the advertisement or promotion for any community or non-school organiza-
tion without the authorization of the School Committee. In this instance, the Committee had
refused to allow students to distribute anti-war leaflets and copies of a "High School Bill of
Rights" on school grounds during school hours. The court found the rule to be unconstitution-
ally vague, since it could be used to hinder expression protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 149. Although the court did not hold that restriction of student expression was unconstitu-
tional per se, it refused to allow use of this rule to prohibit the distribution of student publica-
tions because it "did not reflect any effort to minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint." Id.
This has been the most definitive statement made by the First Circuit regarding the permis-
sibility of prior restraints in public schools. But see Cintron v. State Bd. of Educ., 384 F. Supp.
674 (D.P.R. 1974), in which the district court, without reference to Riseman, struck down a
prior restraint regulation as unconstitutional. Reasoning that "the fact that these cases involve
high school and junior high school students does not affect the standards to be applied, al-
though it may, under certain circumstances, affect the practical application of those standards,"
id. at 678 n.4 (emphasis in original), the court applied the adult prior restraint standards found
in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and Matin v. University of
Puerto Rico, 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1973), and found the regulations to be void on their
face.
87. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972),
where the Fifth Circuit expressly held that requiring student publications to be submitted for
approval prior to publication was not unconstitutional per se. Id. at 969. The court required
only that this type of rule must clearly state the means by which students are to submit pro-
posed materials, the time period within which approval is to be granted or denied, and the
procedure for review of the administrator's decision. Id. at 978.
88. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). See
notes 153-62 and accompanying text infra.
89. The Fourth Circuit is comprised of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Washington, D.C.
90. 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971). The applicable North Carolina school regulation prohibited
distribution of "any advertisements, pamphlets, printed material, written material, announce-
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stitutionality of a regulation imposing a prior restraint. 91 However, the
court did not use a prior restraint analysis. Rather, it purported to apply the
Tinker material disruption standards. 92  Although the words of the Tinker
test were used, they were applied with substantially less scrutiny than
Tinker required. Tinker clearly contemplated that objective evidence would
be necessary to substantiate a school administrator's claims that material dis-
ruption would ensue in the absence of a prior restraint. 93 Nevertheless, the
Quarterman court held that a prior restraint rule could be used if the school
officials reasonably believed it to be necessary. 94  This rather anomalous ap-
plication of the Tinker test created a rule of law under which prior restraint
regulations again could be justified by the school officials' "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance."
ments, or other paraphernalia without the express permission of the principal." Id. at 55.
Distributed without permission was an underground newspaper which proclaimed that "WE
[the students] HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO FIGHT IN THE HALLS AND IN THE
CLASSROOMS ... WE'LL BURN THE BUILDINGS OF OUR SCHOOLS DOWN TO
SHOW THESE PIGS THAT WE WANT AN EDUCATION THAT WON'T BRAINWASH US
INTO BEING RACIST." Id. at 55-56 (capitals in original). The opinion struck down the regula-
tion, even though it was argued that the publication was inflammatory and potentially disrup-
tive, because the plaintiff was punished not for the content of the newspaper, but rather for
distributing it without permission. Id. at 57.
91. Indeed, the court stated that "we are concerned only at this point with' the constitu-
tional validity of the regulation." Id. at 57. However, although the regulation was held to be
facially invalid, the court observed that "its basic vice does not lie in the requirement of prior
permission for the distribution of printed material" since the First Amendment rights of chil-
dren are not "co-extensive with those of adults." Id. at 57-58, citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (Stewart J., concurring).
92. Under Tinker, school authorities do not have to wait until a material disruption actually
takes place. However, this test cannot be used to justify a broad prior restraint. The Court in
Tinker was explicit in stating the criteria to be applied when reviewing such a rule. School
officials seeking to justify restraints on student expression "must be able to show" that the
expression would "materially and substantially interfere" with the education process. Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (emphasis added).
The Tinker Court specifically found that an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance" would not be enough to overcome the right of freedom of expression. Id. at 508.
93. Throughout its opinion, the Tinker Court emphasized the need for objective evidence of
a reasonably anticipated disturbance. For example, the Court found that "[tihere is here no
evidence .. . of ... interference ..., no indication that the work was disrupted," id. at 508,
and that "our independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially inter-
fere. ... Id. at 509. See also id. at 514. In stressing the importance of student First
Amendment rights, the Court held that "in the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression. ... Id.
at 511. Thus, the burden was placed on the state to show that its regulations were not
prompted merely by disagreement with the content of the speech or expression. Id. at 509.
94. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971). Specifically, the court determined
that students' free speech rights may be subject to regulations " 'reasonably designed to adjust
these rights to the needs of the school environment,' " id., quoting Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.
Supp. 1329, 1336 (D.C. Mass. 1970), especially in those circumstances where school officials could
"'reasonably forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities."' Id.,
quoting Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1971). The court did
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Two years later, the Fourth Circuit modified its approach to bring its
criteria regarding prior restraints more in line with those established by
Tinker. In Baughman v. Freienmuth,95 in which the facts and the school
regulation at issue were substantially the same as those in Quarterman, the
court again began with the premise that children's First Amendment rights
are not co-extensive with those of adults. 96 However, it went on to estab-
lish criteria for permissible prior restraints of student publications which
were narrower than those developed in Quarterman.97  In addition, the
court applied the same presumption of unconstitutionality that has been
used in situations involving adults. 98 These criteria required: (1) a clear
definition of "distribution," especially as it may apply to different kinds of
materials;99 (2) a provision for prompt approval/disapproval; (3) a statement
informing the students of the effect of a failure to take prompt administrative
action; and (4) a provision for an adequate and prompt appeal.100
Students' rights were thus expanded to more closely approximate adults'
rights.101 This ruling did not, however, incorporate in their entirety the
require, however, the establishment of criteria for determining whether such permission should be
granted. Id. at 59. In addition, procedural safeguards in the form of an expedited review must be
available. Id. While these requirements parallel some of those afforded adults by Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), see note 101 infra, Freedman's safeguards of speech and expression
were all but emasculated by their application to students in Quarterman.
95. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973). The literature sought to be suppressed was a pamphlet
criticizing the school's prior restraint regulations. The regulation was slightly more specific than
the one in Quarterman because approval could be withheld only if, in the opinion of the princi-
pal, it contained "libelous or obscene language, advocate[d] illegal actions, or [was] grossly
insulting to any group or individual." Id. at 1347.
96. Id. at 1348, 1351.
97. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra.
98. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931). The Baughman court
held that this presumption can be rebutted only if the regulation contains the precise criteria to
be followed by the school authorities in approving the publication and if it provides for pro-
cedural safeguards including prompt and adequate review of the decision. Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (1973). The court cited Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54,
58-59 (4th Cir. 1971), as authority for this requirement. However, it should be noted that
Quarterman contained only the bare assertion that procedural safeguards are required, without
specifying what procedures would be sufficient.
99. For instance, some types of materials cannot be made subject to prior restraints unless a
substantial disruption is contemplated and certain types of limited circulation material may
never be able to provoke the sort of substantial disruption against which school authorities may
protect. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 811 (2d Cir. 1971). See notes 148-52
and accompanying text infra. Other types of material, for example that which is obscene or
libelous, may be the subject of valid prior restraints regardless of the extent of distribution,
provided that the regulation defines precisely what is forbidden. Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973).
101. The effect of the Baughman ruling was to prevent the use of "unbridled discretion of
school officials," Southeastern Promotors, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975), and to
provide for prompt findings and an expedited appeal, two of the safeguards required by the
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procedural safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland,10 2 an earlier Su-
preme Court decision dealing with prior restraints imposed under a state
motion picture censorship statute. The Freedman safeguards placed the bur-
den of proof on the censor, allowed prior restraints only for a brief time
before a judicial determination on the merits, and required a prompt judicial
review of the censor's decision. In contrast, the Baughman court did not
place the burden of proof upon the school officials to prove non-conformity
with the standards. More importantly, the new rule did not specifically re-
quire the inclusion of any type of adversary proceeding. However, from a
practical standpoint, such a hearing is crucial.' 0 3  Unless the student is al-
lowed some participation in this determination, the path will be clear once
again for the exercise of unilateral discretion by school officials in censoring
student speech and expression.
This lack of procedural safeguards was corrected in Nitzberg v. Parks. '
0 4
In that case, the school board's policies were rejected because they did not
properly detail the elements of libel and obscenity when prohibiting the
publication or distribution of libelous or obscene materials. 10 5 Their most
Supreme Court for prior restraint of adult expression in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965). See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348-49, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973).
Freedman v. Maryland involved the constitutional challenge of a state censorship statute
which required the submission of motion pictures to a state board of censors for prior review
and approval. In that case, the Court held that certain procedural safeguards must be present
in order to rebut the presumption that a prior restraint statute is unconstitutional. Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965). The safeguards required: (1) the censor to prove that the
speech was not protected by the First Amendment; (2) any restraint imposed prior to judicial
review to be limited to preserving the status quo and also limited to the shortest period of time
compatible with sound judicial resolution; and (3) a prompt and final judicial review to minimize
the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. Id. at 58-59.
102. 380 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1965).
103. It is not suggested here that a judicial-type hearing is necessary, but only that some
hearing with bona fide student participation is required. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975).
104. 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975). In this case, two private student newspapers were ordered
to cease publication under a regulation authorizing prior restraint of "non-school literature." The
district court had enjoined implementation of the regulation for reasons of vagueness and over-
breadth and ordered a series of four revisions before finding that the rule met the constitutional
standards previously adopted by the court of appeals in Baughman. Id. at 380-81. See notes
95-103 and accompanying text supra. The court of appeals disagreed and issued an opinion
addressing the details of its prior rulings.
105. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 381-83 (4th Cir. 1975). The relevant portion of the
regulation states:
Literature may be distributed and posted by the student of the subject school in
designated areas on school property as long as it is not obscene or libelous (as
defined below) and as long as the distribution of said literature does not reasonably
lead the principal to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities.
Id. at 381. The indicated definitions of libel and obscenity were written in legal terminology.
The court struck down the libel definition because it failed to apply the standard of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its progeny. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378,
383 (4th Cir. 1975). However, it can also be argued that the highly sophisticated wording of the
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crucial flaw, however, was procedural. The court took special note of the fact
that the regulation lacked guidelines for determining what would constitute a
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities," ' 0 6
as well as for what would be the appropriate criteria an administrator might
use to reasonably predict the occurrence of such a disruption. 
1 0 7
While the court relied on Quarterman and Baughman, quoting exten-
sively from each decision, 10 8 the holding in Nitzberg was in effect a com-
plete rejection of Quarterman's interpretaton and use of the Tinker material
disruption standard as a test of the constitutionality of student prior re-
straints. 109 The court did not expressly overrule or modify Quarterman, but
it did question the validity of the decision's reasoning. 110 The detail
Nitzberg required"' of student prior restraint regulations is significant,
therefore, in that it indicates that strict scrutiny is now being applied by the
Fourth Circuit. 112
regulation did not provide its intended audience (high school students and administrators) with
meaningful notice of the types of materials prohibited.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court also found that these regulations lacked the requisite procedural
safeguards adopted in Baughman. Specifically, they did not provide for adequate notice of their
existence (a copy was to be "made available to all students in a readily accessible and announced
location"), id. n.4; review procedures and their timing were unclear (the court found that re-
quiring an approval/disapproval decision within a certain number of "pupil days" was not suffi-
ciently specific unless "pupil days" was defined), id. at 383-84; and the nature of the review was
too vague (since violation of the rule could result in suspension, due process requirements of
confrontation and a hearing must be afforded), id. at 384.
108. In addition to quoting the "controlling constitutional principles in student publication
cases for this Circuit" as set forth in Quarterman, id. at 382, quoting Quarterman v. Byrd, 453
F.2d 54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1971), the court noted that Judge Craven, in Baughman, had "re-
emphasized the necessity of 'narrow, objective and reasonable standards' as the essential ele-
ment in any system of prior restraint," Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1975),
quoting Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350 (4th Cir. 1973). Not content merely to
cite to Baughman, the Nitzberg court stressed the importance of the requirements set out in
that opinion by repeating them verbatim. Id. at 382.
109. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra.
110. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975), quoting Jacobs v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973). For further discussion regarding the Jacobs deci-
sion, see notes 130-136 and accompanying text infra.
111. The court in Nitzberg found that the prior restraints were unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad because of their definitional and procedural deficiencies. 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir.
1975).
112. However, this should not be interpreted as a sign of an "interventionist court." There is,
and should be, a general judicial reluctance to interfere with school board decisions regarding
daily operations of the school system. See note 75 supra. However, the Nitzberg court felt that
its duty to uphold the Constitution required some supervision of school authorities. The court
noted: "[W]e cannot remain silent when we truly believe that the regulations as presently writ-
ten will raise more problems than they will solve. We have both compassion and understanding
of the difficulties facing school administrators, but we cannot permit those conditions to sup-
press First Amendment rights of individual students." Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 384 (4th
Cir. 1975). See also Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977), where the court
found the regulation to be "a monument to vagueness." Id. at 748. This opinion echoed the
appellate court's impatience with school officials for necessitating yet more litigation in this area,
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In Gambino v. Fairfax County School Board,113 a Virginia district court
decision, the regulations were found to be facially valid but unconstitutional
as applied to prohibit publication of the article in question. 1 1 4  The Gam-
bino opinion, remaining consistent with both the letter and spirit of other
Fourth Circuit cases, 1 1 5 presented a sophisticated First Amendment analysis
of the prior restraint, as opposed to a student-First Amendment analysis.
Thus, the court viewed the key issue as whether the student newspaper was
a proper First Amendment forum.116  No distinctions were made between a
student-forum and an adult-forum, 117 and adult First Amendment cases were
used to determine both the forum's existence and the validity of regulations
seeking to restrict it."18 In finding that the newspaper was indeed a First
noting that a virtually identical provision was struck down in Nitzberg, id. at 749, and that the
regulation at bar presented the same type of vagueness which had led to invalidation of regula-
tions in Quartermnan and Baughman. Id. at 748. Perhaps the court's impatience was not unwar-
ranted; also under consideration was Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731
(E.D. Va. 1977), an opinion issued two days after Leibner. See notes 113-24 and accompanying
text infra. In addition, Leibner addressed the question of whether irreparable harm would re-
sult if the court, in finding that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits, was to refuse
issuance of a temporary restraining order. Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744, 748
(E.D. Va. 1977). The court held that such harm, in the form of a chilling effect on protected
expression, was likely if an order prohibiting enforcement of the prior restraint was not issued.
Id. at 749. The Leibner court emphasized the Fourth Circuit policy that the public interest is
advanced by the protection rather than repression of First Amendment activity of students. Id.
at 749-50. The clear import of this finding is that adminstrative prerogative may not he used to
subordinate the constitutionally protected rights of students. See also Nitzberg v. Parks, 525
F.2d 378, 384 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975).
113. 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977). This dispute was prompted by an article entitled
Sexually Active Students Fail to Use Contraceptives, which was submitted for publication in the
school newspaper. Portions of the article contained contraceptive information and portions re-
ported the results of a poll taken of student attitudes. At the time, the school board policy
prohibited the schools from offering sex education. Based on that policy, the principal ordered
the students not to publish the article as written. Her decision was upheld by the Advisory
Board on Student Expression, the division superintendent, and the school board.
114. Id. at 736-37.
115. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
116. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Va. 1977).
117. Id. at 735 n.2, where the court stated that "[tihe youth of the audience is not deter-
minative of the existence vel non of First Amendment protection."
118. Id. at 734-35. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (regard-
ing the captive audience principle); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (the application
of the captive audience principle to newspapers); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.
1973) (once a state university recognizes a student activity that has elements of free expression,
it can act to censor that expression only if its acts are consistent with First Amendment guaran-
tees); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970) (state funding does not pre-
clude application of First Amendment protection).
In addition, the Gambino court found it necessary to place the effect of the school setting in
its proper constitutional perspective, holding that "[wihile the scope of constitutional freedoms
may vary with the nature of the environment and the maturity of the individuals affected, the
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Amendment forum, the court noted that it had been "conceived, established
and operated as a conduit for student expression on a wide variety of top-
ics" 119 rather than an "in-house organ of the school system." 120 Since it
could not be viewed as an integral part of the school curriculum, the court
felt it could not properly be made subject to the curriculum regulation. 121
The court also rejected the board's argument that a greater degree of re-
striction was justified because the students constituted a "captive audi-
ence." 122 It found that no qualitative distinction could be made between
the "forced exposure" present in this case and that found in Tinker. 123
Furthermore, a distinction in degree would not serve to enhance the school
board's position. In Gambino, the students had to act affirmatively to pick
up and read the newspaper in order to be exposed to its contents, whereas
in Tinker the students had to act affirmatively (look away) in order not to be
so exposed. 124
To summarize, the current state of the student prior restraint law in the
Fourth Circuit approximates adult prior restraint law. This is evidenced by
strict application of the Tinker test, which has the effect of using the clear
and present danger test in the school environment. The procedural
safeguards of Freedman have been adapted to the context of the public high
school as far as :is practicable. Most importantly, courts in the Fourth Circuit
are applying strict scrutiny to make these determinations.
considerations governing the applicability of First Amendment analysis in the first instance does
not change." Gambino v. Fairfisx County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 734-35 (E.D. Va. 1977).
See also note 39 and text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
119. Id. at 735.
120. Id. at 734, 736.
121. The court specifically found the newspaper to be more akin to the school library, which
contained information on birth control and was available to students despite the board's cur-
riculum regulation. Id. at 736.
122. Id. at 735-36. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court
distinguished a potential audience in an open First Amendment forum from a "captive audi-
ence" which has "no 'choice or volition' to observe [the speech]." Id. at 302, quoting Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932). This factor was held to alter the forum sufficiently to
justify reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations upon access to it. Id. at 304. The school
board in Gambino argued that the captive audience principle should be applied because the
distribution of the newspapers in homerooms, the official status of the newspaper, the require-
ment that students desiring a yearbook subscribe to the paper and peer pressure would all work
to compel student exposure to the newspaper's contents. Gambino v. Fairfax County School
Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (E.D. Va. 1977).
123. id. at 736.
124. Id. The regulation was found not to be facially invalid even though it lacked the detailed
criteria required by Baughman and Nitzberg. See notes 95-103, 104-12, and accompanying text
supra. The court did find, however, that the regulation could not be applied to prohibit publi-
cation of the article in question. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736
(E. D. Va. 1977). Nevertheless, this does not represent a loosening of the standards used to test
the facial validity of student prior restraints. The regulation in question was intended as a policy
statement regarding permissible curriculum subjects and was not aimed at limiting student ex-
pression.
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C. Minority Positions
The Seventh Circuit-A Per Se Rule
for Student Prior Restraints
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a more stringent position,125 holding that
pre-publication censorship of student literature amounts to an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint. 126  In one case, Fujishima v. Board of Education,1
27
the Tinker forecast rule was rejected as a justification for such prior re-
straints.128  The court decided that the Tinker test should govern only the
constitutionality of post-publication penalties, and not that of prior restraints
on expression. 1
29
This stance was followed in Jacobs v. Board of School Commissioners, 130
in which a similar prior restraint regulation was found to be unconstitutional.
125. Although only the Seventh Circuit expressly prohibits prior restraints, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's very strict scrutiny of such regulation approaches the same result. See notes 104-12 and
accompanying text supra.
126. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973); Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
127. 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). This case involved a board of education rule that prohib-
ited the distribution on school premises of any book or publication without the approval of the
superintendent of schools. In one instance, two students were suspended for distributing copies
of an underground newspaper before and between classes and during the lunch period. In the
other, a student was suspended twice: once for giving another student an unsigned copy of a
petition concerning the Vietnam war and again for distributing leaflets about the war during a
fire drill. In no case did the distribution cause any disturbance or interfere with educational
process.
128. 1d. at 1358-59. The court specifically found Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d
803 (2d Cir. 1971), to be "unsound constitutional law" in its interpretation of Tinker as "allow-
[ing] prior restraint of publication-long a constitutionally prohibited power-as a tool of school
officials in 'forecasting' substantial disruption of school activities." Fujishima v. Board of Educ.,
460 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1972). See notes 137-52 and accompanying text infra. The
Fujishima court also rejected the Fourth Circuit's early effort in this area, Quarterman v. Byrd,
453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971). Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972).
See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra. As suggested above, the current state of the law
in the Fourth Circuit is more in line with that of the Seventh Circuit than it was at the time of
the Fujishima decision. See note 125 supra.
129. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1972). The court did not
feel, however, that a school board could be prevented from issuing "reasonable, specific regula-
tions setting forth the time, manner and place in which distribution of written materials may
occur." Id. at 1359. This is consistent with the Tinker test, both as developed in the Supreme
Court opinion, ("[blut conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-
whether it stems from time, place or type of behavior-[causes a material disruption] ...is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech," Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)), and as interpreted by
the Seventh Circuit. See text. It is also the same limitation that is imposed on adult speech and
expression. See note 37 supra. The Fujishima court held that, while the board properly could
prohibit the distribution of any publication or literature during fire drills, such a rule could not
be applied ex post facto to the plaintiff. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th
Cir. 1972). Similarly, it found that regulations providing for post-publication punishments for
students who distribute obscene or libelous material might be permissible. Id. at 1359.
130. 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973). The plaintiffs had published and distributed four issues of
their newspaper but just prior to distribution of the fifth issue the school authorities imposed a
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The court in Jacobs found that the use of "careful scrutiny" was warranted
when testing the regulation for vagueness. 131 The major thrust of the
Jacobs opinion was directed at reviewing the regulations for vagueness and
overbreadth. At first glance this may seem to be a significant modification of
Fujishima's absolute prohibition of prior restraints on student publica-
tions, 132 but an examination of the effect of the decision, rather than the
methodology, reveals that this is not the case.
The court found that the regulations were vague because they did not
define the circumstances which would make the distribution of literature
unlawful. 133 Proposing examples of behavior which conceivably could be
included in the regulation's prohibition, 134 the court indicated that "con-
sequences" which did not amount to obscenity, libel, or threat of an actual
and substantial disruption would not be sufficient to sustain the regula-
tion.' 35 The effect was to require a degree of statutory precision which only
would restrain either speech not protected by the First Amendment-
obscenity and libel-or speech meeting the clear and present danger
criteria. 136
rule prohibiting its sale or distribution at school without the express prior approval of the
superintendent. The superintendent forbade circulation of their paper because it contained
obscene materials. Even though the rules were amended after the litigation began, the court
found that they were both vague and overbroad. Id. at 604. Curiously, although the Jacobs
court utilized the same basic approach as the Fujishima court had, the latter decision was not
cited in Jacobs as precedent for prohibiting prior restraint of student publications.
131. The court first detailed the policy reasons for requiring precision in criminal statutes. Id.
at 604-05. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); United States v.
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 355 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). Then, recogniz-
ing that the regulation in question was not a criminal statute, the court nevertheless found that
the possible penalties of suspension or expulsion were "sufficiently grievous to mandate careful
scrutiny." Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973).
132. See Note, First Amendment-Prior Restraint-Board of Education .Rule Requiring
Prior Submission of Private Student Newspapers Is Unconstitutionally Vague and
Overbroad-Nitzberg v. Parks, 35 MD. L. REv. 512, 519 n.46, and accompanying text.(1976).
133. Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973). The "conse-
quences" were articulated in the board's regulations as "significant disruption of the normal
educational processes, functions or purposes in any of the Indianapolis schools, or injury to
others." Id. at 604-605.
134. The court queried: "Is decorum in the lunchroom a 'normal educational ... purpose'? If
an article sparks strident discussion there, is the latter a 'disruption'? . . . The phrase 'injury to
others' is also vague .... Does it include hurt feelings and impairment of reputation by de-
rogatory criticism, short of defamation ... ?" Id. at 605.
135. Id.
136. This was the same approach taken by the Supreme Court when defining constitutionally
permissible prior restraints of obscene materials for adults. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973), where the Court held that "[sitate statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited .... [We now define the permissible scope of such regula-
tion to works [depicting sexual conduct as] specifically defined by the applicable state law." See
also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682-85, 690 (1968) ("the absence of
narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards ... is fatal"). In these limited contexts,
assuming there are appropriate procedural safeguards, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965), see note 101 supra, prior restraint regulations also have been upheld in adult situations.
See, e.g., Southeastern Promotors, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (prior restraints are not
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The Second Circuit -Minimal Scrutiny of Prior Restraints
The Second Circuit, also in a minority, has adopted a position which is
nearly the antithesis of that taken by the Seventh Circuit, both in approach
and ultimate result. In Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,137 the Connec-
ticut district court found impermissible a regulation requiring the submission
of the specific content of a publication for approval prior to its distribu-
tion.1 38  Although the finding of unconstitutionality was upheld on ap-
peal, 139 the Second Circuit, applying minimal scrutiny, 140 held that the
school officials could validly restrain the distribution of disruptive matter to
the extent allowed by Tinker. 141 With this in mind, the court imposed an
additional requirement upon the school regulation so that it would approxi-
mate the Tinker standard: "[A]lthough the policy does not specify that the
foreseeable disruption be either 'material' or 'substantial,' as Tinker requires,
we assume that the Board would never contemplate the futile as well as
unconstitutional suppression of matter that would create only an immaterial
disturbance." 142 After saving it from fatal overbreadth through the use of
this legal fiction, the court went on to impute factors to the regulation which
served to lessen its vagueness. For instance, since the regulation did not
authorize any punishment, the court believed it would have no chilling ef-
fect.143  Further, because it operated only on school property, the rule was
unconstitutional per se); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1961); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). For these reasons, prior restraints in similar circumstances
would be permissible when applied to students. However, prior restraints on otherwise pro-
tected speech and expression remain illegal in the Seventh Circuit.
137. 314 F. Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1970).
138. Id. at 835. Students here sought to distribute, free of prior restraints, copies of a news-
paper they had written as well as other printed and written literature. The district court held
that the prior restraint was unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) a requirement of prior approval
of the contents of the publication, in the absence of even a "scintilla of proof" to justify it, is
invalid under Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); and (2) the regulation lacked adequate
procedural safeguards as specified in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832, 834-36 (D. Conn. 1970).
139. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
140. Id. at 807. Illustrative of the minimal scrutiny applied by the Second Circuit is its
deference to state assertions of the "potential evils" which the prior restraint rule sought to
eliminate. It was noted that "[elarly involvement in social comment and debate is a good
method for future generations of adults to learn intelligent involvement. But we cannot deny
that Connecticut has authority to minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or dis-
rupt the effectiveness of the educational process as the state conceives it." Id. (emphasis added).
This is not the authority defined by the Supreme Court in Tinker as being constitutionally
exercisable by boards of education. Rather, it is precisely that "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance" which the Tinker Court rejected as insufficient under the First
Amendment. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969). It is also a restriction of the "marketplace of ideas" concept of classroom discussion
which was similarly rejected in Tinker as constitutionally invalid. Id. at 512-13.
141. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
142. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original).
143. Id.
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not considered unreasonable since it did not restrict the students' right to
distribute the newspapers outside of school. 144 The court concluded, there-
fore, that the students' First Amendment freedoms would not be unduly
hampered. 1
45
Nevertheless, the regulation was found unconstitutional because it lacked
the procedural safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland. 146 This find-
ing, however, does not provide adequate protection. The only safeguards the
court demanded were: (1) a provision for an expedited review procedure, 147
and (2) a precise definition of the term "distribute." 148 In regard to the
latter, the court assumed that the school board intended "distribution" to
mean "substantial distribution." It held, though, that the definition must be
more precise so that the "distribution" of a single copy of a publication (such
as Newsweek) by one student to another would not fall within the scope of
the regulation. 149 It is curious that this language was found to be uncon-
stitutionally vague in light of the court's finding that the "disruption" section
of the regulation was not vague because it could be presumed that the
school board meant "substantial disruption." 150 By definition, the term
"distribution" eliminates this type of vagueness, 151 whereas "disruption"
does not. 152 As a result of Eisner, as long as the school officials define
144. Id.
145. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the First Amendment was not offended by
the regulation because it was "in many ways narrowly drawn to achieve its permissible pur-
poses, and indeed may fairly be characterized as a regulation of speech, rather than a blanket
prior restraint." Id.
146. Id. at 810-11; see note 101 supra. The court stated that the board's policy did not
impose "nearly so onerous a 'prior restraint' as was involved in Freedman." Id. at 810. There-
fore, it held that not all of the Freedman requirements were necessary in the school environ-
ment. Id. School officials were not required to seek a judicial determination before denying
approval for distribution. Id. Under Freedman, the state is required to assume the burden of
proving that approval should not be granted. The Eisner court found, however, that since
school authorities would have to demonstrate a reasonable basis for the decision if the student
chose to litigate, this would be sufficient to satisfy Freedman in the special context of the school
setting. Id. Since the court had already dismissed the need for a prior judicial determination,
such postponement affords little protection of students' First Amendment freedoms and fails to
eliminate the possibility of arbitrary decision-making by the designated officials which was pro-
hibited in Southeastern Promotors, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
147. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971).
148. Id. at 811.
149. Id.
150. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
151. "Distribute: ... la: to divide among several or many ... especially to members of a
group." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
660 (1961) (emphasis added).
152. "Disrupt: ... 1b: to throw into disorder or turmoil. 2: to interrupt to the extent of
stopping, preventing normal continuance of, or destroying." Id. at 656.
An examination of this definition reveals that the addition of the modifier "substantial" is
relevant to the determination of the constitutionality of the disruption standard, since Tinker in
essence requires an approximation of the "clear and present danger" test. See notes 34-41 and
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"distribution" and provide for a prompt review, students in the Second Cir-
cuit will have little protection from prior restraints.
The most recent Second Circuit venture into this area, Trachtman v.
Anker,153 appears to be even less solicitous of student rights. In addition to
being the only reported student prior restraint decision in which the stu-
dents have lost at the appellate level, Trachtman's approach was unique.
The case bears substantial similarity to Ginsberg v. New York 154 in that its
central issue involves a restriction imposed on the distribution of sexually-
oriented materials to minors. Student staff members of the high school
newspaper were denied permission to survey the sexual attitudes of students
and publish their interpretation of the results.155  As in Ginsberg, it is im-
possible to determine the extent to which the result was prompted by the
presence of the obscenity issue, rather than by prior restraint consideration.
The similarity, however, ends at this point, for in Ginsberg the Supreme
Court considered itself bound to scrutinize the state's asserted justifica-
tions. 156  The Trachtman court, however, used a rational basis/minimal
scrutiny test. 15 7 Although the Second Circuit indicated that "bare allega-
tions" of harm would not satisfy this test, 158 it nevertheless upheld the prior
restraint by relying upon expert affidavits which presented little more than
assertions that potential emotional harm might be suffered by "at least some
students" as a result of the survey. 159
accompanying text supra. However, requiring that the term "distribute" also be modified by
"substantial" has no constitutional effect since speech has never been protected or not protected
on the basis of audience size.
153. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
154. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
155. The survey proposed was a randomly distributed questionnaire accompanied by a cover
letter cautioning the student to not answer questions about which he or she felt uncomfortable.
The principal's decision was upheld in successive appeals. The appeal process, which culmi-
nated with an action in the federal courts, took nearly nine months to resolve. Trachtman v.
Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1977). This was hardly the "expedited appeal" con-
templated by Freedman and found to be applicable to the student press by a majority of appel-
late courts, see notes 99-103 and accompanying text supra, but the Trachtmnan court nonetheless
did not address the issue of procedural safeguards.
156. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
157. The court took the position that: "[in determining the constitutionality of restrictions on
student expression such as are involved here, it is not the function of the courts to reevaluate
the wisdom of the actions of state officials charged with protecting the health and welfare of
public school students," particularly where a rational basis exists for the restrictions imposed.
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1977).
158. Id. at 517.
159. Id. at 517-19. Admittedly, there was expert testimony on both sides of the issue of
psychological harm. However, the all-important context of the proposed speech must be consid-
ered as well. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); note 38 and accompanying text supra. As
Judge Mansfield pointed out in his dissent in Trachtman, the students of this New York City
high school were literally "bombarded by sexually-laden stimuli" in the media and on the way
to school. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 524 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J., dissenting). In
addition, the school provided an extensive sex education program including peer rap groups. Id.
In this context it is difficult to believe that a voluntary, anonymous survey can be said to cause
[Vol. 28:387
1979] FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN HIGH SCHOOL 417
In addition, Trachtman was the first decision to employ the forgotten sec-
ond half of the Tinker test. That test also held that conduct shown to sub-
stantially invade the rights of others is not protected by the First Amend-
ment and, therefore, may properly be subjected to procedurally valid prior
restraints. 160 The students in Trachtman sought to elicit information about
sexuality. 16 1 This, the court found, would "invade the rights of other stu-
dents by subjecting them to psychological pressures which may engender
significant emotional harm" and, therefore, could be prohibited by the
school board without offending Tinker. 1
62
D. Supreme Court: Action by Inaction?
The Supreme Court, by virtue of its uncertain stance regarding the level
of scrutiny to be applied in this area, has provided the lower courts with a
wealth of theories, tests, and justifications from which to choose when decid-
ing children's rights cases. In the absence of strong leadership from the Su-
preme Court, each circuit has developed a separate and somewhat unique
body of law concerning the issue of student prior restraints. Although the
results have been admirable in that student First Amendment rights are
almost uniformly protected, the diversity of theories applied to achieve this
protection has resulted in the confusing and chaotic development of the law.
However, the rights of children are too important to permit the law to con-
tinue to develop on such a piecemeal basis.
With this in mind, it may seem unfortunate that the Supreme Court did
not grant certiorari in Trachtman. ' 6 3 However, Trachtman would not have
been the best vehicle to use in attempting to "settle" this area of the law,
since the presence of the sexual materials issue might have obscured the
Court's consideration of the more crucial issues. The Court's position on the
additional anxiety about sexual matters. Judge Mansfield's dissent also noted that "[tihe danger
... is . . .minute compared with the enormous benefit to be derived from students learning
that their concerns are common and developmentally normal." Id. at 525 (Mansfield, J., dissent-
ing).
160. The test adopted in Tinker reads:
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it
stems from time, place or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or in-
volves substantial . . .invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (em-
phasis added). But see Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting). Judge Mansfield interprets the test used by the majority as dicta from Tinker which
was inapplicable to the issue presented in Trachtman because it "represents an entirely too
vague and nebulous extension of the concept of'rights' to support the drastic type of censorship
sought by the defendants." Id. at 521.
161. Id. at 514-16. The court found that the factual situation in Trachtman was distinguish-
able from those in Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.
1972), see note 87 supra, and Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515
F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975), because those cases involved only the distribution of information about
birth control. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 516 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).
162. Id.
163. Trachtman v. Anker, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
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state's power over minors with respect to obscenity and sexual materials was
stated clearly in Ginsberg. What is needed now is a ruling which deals solely
with the student press issue. Until such a ruling is made, each circuit will
continue to develop and apply its own unique theory. ' 64 However, the case
law in each circuit is sufficiently well developed so that, barring a major
change by the Supreme Court, the burden is now on the educational profes-
sion to revise and amend their policies and regulations to conform with the
guarantees of the Constitution.
III. THEORY IN PRACTICE: EFFECT ON EDUCATION
Although the level of protection varies among the circuits, it is undisputed
that children have First Amendment rights and that these rights include the
freedom to publish and distribute literature in and near public high schools.
Proponents of student press rights have made significant advances in the
decade since Tinker. However, these advances will be meaningless if they
are applied only to those students who have the initiative and parental sup-
port to challenge prior restraints in the federal courts. Non-legal responses
to the changing law fall into four basic categories: student, administrative,
legislative and curricular. But it remains to be seen whether the educational
system will give full effect to the rights enunciated by the courts.
165
A. Student Response
A major fear, which has hampered more widespread acceptance of the
prior restraint doctrine in the school, setting, is that such an application
would result in disruption of the educational process by irresponsible stu-
dent speech and expression. This position was forcefully presented in Justice
Black's dissent in Tinker, where he predicted "the beginning of a new rev-
olutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary." 166
164. The activity in this area has been sufficient to warrant the establishment of the Student
Press Law Center, a national organization devoted exclusively to protecting the First Amend-
ment rights of high school and college journalists. The Center provides legal assistance and
information to student journalists and faculty advisors experiencing censorship or other legal
problems. The Student Press Law Center Report summarizes current cases, controversies, and
studies involving student press rights. It can be obtained by contacting: Student Press Law
Center, Suite 1112, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005; (202) 347-6888.
165. See generally COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HIGH SCHOOL JOURNALISM, CAPTIVE
VOICES: HIGH SCHOOL JOURNALISM IN AMERICA (1974), for a report on the student press in the
early 1970s.
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black further speculated:
Uncontrolled and uncontrollable liberty is an enemy to domestic peace .... One
does not need to be a prophet... to know that after the Court's holding today some
students in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools will be ready, able, and willing to
defy their teachers on practically all orders. . . .Turned loose with law-
suits... against their teachers... it is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that
young, immature students will not soon believe it is their right to control the
schools . . . [which will subject] all the public schools in the country to the whims
and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students.
Id. at 524-25.
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By all available evidence, Justice Black's "Tinker 'forecast"' has not
materialized.161 A number of recently conducted surveys 168 indicate, not
that dissident students have taken over the nation's schools, but rather that
the judicial turmoil over student press rights has had no significant impact
on the educational process. 169 Apparently, very few schools have altered
their prior restraint policies or regulations in response to changes in the law,
although the surveys also show that most school administrators do not re-
quire prior review of all student publications. 1 70  One survey 17 1 found that
since Fujishima there has been no increase in the number of underground
newspapers and only eight schools out of 1200 have experienced an increase
in disruptions. 172 However, the report does not indicate whether these dis-
ruptions were related to student publications or even whether these eight
schools had adopted the Fujishima no-prior restraint policy.
The evidence thus demonstrates that Justice Black's dire predictions of
increased disruption of the educational process by students wielding First
Amendment rights 173 have not been realized. As a result, a circular relation-
ship has developed between the judicial and student responses. In future
decisions, the courts will be forced to consider this evidence that students
have not abused their First Amendment rights when given the opportunity
and freedom to exercise them. It is significant that surveys 17 were con-
ducted in the Seventh Circuit, which has been the most liberal in granting
First Amendment freedoms to students. 1 75 If that circuit's absolute ban on
167. It should be noted, however, that Justice Black's words were written in an environment
of general campus unrest, both at the college and high school levels, which was marked by
"break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins and smash-ins." Id. at 525. With the abatement of that unrest, extend-
ing freedom of expression to students may no longer appear to be a "clear and present danger"
in and of itself, without reference to the circumstances and the likelihood of material disruption.
168. See J. NYKA, 'Press' Four-Letter Word In Illinois, 1 STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER
RPT. 9 (Spring 1978) (survey of 121 Illinois high schools with populations of more than 1000
students regarding student press rights) [hereinafter cited as NYKA SURVEY]; R. TRACER, Sur-
vey Reveals Little Change In Censorship Following Ruling Banning Prior Restraint, 1
STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER Rr'r. I (Spring 1977) (survey of 1200 public schools in the Seventh
Circuit to determine the effect of the Fujishima decision, see notes 125-29 and accompanying
text supra, on the functioning of school newspapers) [hereinafter cited as TRACER SURVEY]. See
generally Zirkel, A Test On Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Education, 59 PHI DELTA KAP-
PAN 521 (1978) in which a survey conducted among educators to determine their awareness of
Supreme Court decisions affecting virtually every aspect of public school operations was dis-
cussed. The question concerning Tinker and its progeny-The school district [must/may/must
not/don't know] allow pupils to wear armbands, picket peacefully, distribute publications, or
otherwise express; their beliefs where such means of expression are not shown to materially
disrupt or substantially interfere with school activities-was answered correctly by only 52% of
the respondents.
169. See also text accompanying notes 182-85 infra.
170. See also text accompanying note 186 infra.
171. See TRACER SURVEY, note 168 supra.
172. Id. at 1.
173. See notes 166-67 and accompanying text supra.
174. See note 168 supra.
175. See notes 125-36 and accompanying text supra.
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prior restraint of student publications has not wreaked havoc on the educa-
tional system, it is difficult to believe that the more moderate majority posi-
tion would lead to such a result. And if prior restraints can no longer reason-
ably be justified as a means of preventing substantial disruption of either
discipline or the educational process, imposition of them clearly would of-
fend constitutional and Supreme Court mandates. 17
6
B. Administrative Response
The most obvious method by which to quell a troublesome student press
is through the school's regulatory powers. The courts have defined the con-
stitutionally permissible limits of such regulations and even in the Seventh
Circuit school authorities may impose certain restrictions on student publica-
tions distributed on the school premises. 177 A recent article for educators
and administrators outlined the legal control mechanisms that constitution-
ally could be employed with respect to student publications.' 17  For exam-
ple, regulations can validly restrain publication and distribution of materials
which are outside the scope of the First Amendment. 179 The author also
suggests that school boards adopt policies which clearly delineate the rights
and duties of the student staff in the publication of school-sponsored news-
papers. 180
A set of model guidelines for student publications was recently published
by the Student Press Law Center.181 Their proposal is intended to embrace
all school-sponsored publications, including yearbooks and literary
magazines, as well as non-school-sponsored publications. The premise under-
lying these guidelines is set forth in an introductory policy statement where
the importance of protecting the autonomy of forums for student expression
is stressed. Comprehensive definitions of prohibited areas and materials are
included. These definitions are couched in terms which will be meaningful
to the students, faculty, and administrators involved.18 2 A list of specifically
protected areas has also been included. 183
176. To allow prior restraints of speech or expression which does not actually threaten disci-
pline or education would be to respond to the undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance, a response which was found to be clearly unconstitutional in Tinker. Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). See notes 32-48 and
accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 126-36 and accompanying text supra.
178. Nolte, The Student Press and Ways You Can Control It, 165 AM. SCHOOL BD. J. 35
(March 1978).
179. Materials not protected by the First Amendment include those which are libelous,
obscene, which would invade the privacy of others, or would cause a substantial disruption. Id.
at 35, 36, 62.
180. Id. at 35, 62. Of course, the policy guidelines developed by the school must not violate
First Amendment principles.
181. See Student Press Law Center Model Guidelines for Student Publications, 2 STUDENT
PRESS L. CENTER Rpr. 33 (Winter 1978-79). These Guidelines have been reproduced in an
Appendix. See note 211 infra. For information on the Student Press Law Center, see note 164
supra.
182. See Appendix § 11 (B).
183. See Appendix § I11.
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The Student Press Law Center's recommendations are founded on case
law in this area, although, strictly speaking, they are consistent only with the
law in those circuits which have afforded students full First Amendment
freedoms.184 However, even in jurisdictions which have been unwilling to
extend this level of protection to minors,'18 5 school boards are not foreclosed
from adopting policies and regulations which allow students a greater degree
of freedom of expression than has been mandated by the courts. Although all
school systems seriously should consider adopting these guidelines as formu-
lated by the Center, there is leeway for modification to accommodate the
needs of the school and the requirements of the particular circuit. Perhaps
successful experimentation with even modified forms will lead to future sup-
port for policies allowing students greater freedom of expression.
Surveys conducted to study prior restraints in public high schools 186 do
not show the extent to which clear policy statements have been formulated.
The results of these surveys do indicate, however, that administrative re-
straint and repression of student expression might not have been as perva-
sive as indicated by the amount of litigation in this area.
The Trager survey,' 8 7 conducted to determine the effect of the Seventh
Circuit's ban on prior restraints of student publications, found that only fif-
teen percent of the principals and ten percent of the publications' advisors
had even heard of the Fujishima decision. Sixty-two per cent of the respon-
dents believed that school advisors still had the authority to impose prior
restraints on student expression.' 88 Similar results were obtained in the
Nyka survey,'i8 9 which concluded that administrators are either unaware of
student rights or "have simply chosen to ignore them, hoping that the legal
pendulum will swing the other way." 190
Given these findings, it is safe to assume that judicial protection of student
press rights has not prompted educators to change their policies and regula-
tions. In spite of the fact that no change in policy is apparent, eighty-two per
cent of the schools responding in the Trager survey reported that school
administrators do not require prior review of all student publications. 19 1
However, this statistic is not as encouraging as it first appears. Both surveys
found that "controversial" material still is reviewed in some manner by
educators in about one-half of the responding schools. 192 Accordingly, it is
crucial to continue efforts to provide and safeguard student press rights,
since the potential for abuse remains strong.
184. See text accompanying notes 125-36 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 137-62 supra.
186. See note 168 supra.
187. Id.
188. TRACER SURVEY, supra note 168, at 1.
189. See note 168 supra.
190. NYKA SURVEY, supra note 168, at 9.
191. TRACER SURVEY, supra note 168, at 1.
192. Id.; NYKA SURVEY, supra note 168, at 9. The respondents to the Nyka survey indicated
strong objections to student coverage of gay liberation, criticism of the principal or administra-
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C. Legislative Response
In the ten years since the Tinker decision there has been some alteration
and revision of policies and regulations regarding the student press. 193 How-
ever, California is the only state which has adopted a state-wide policy in
this area. 194 With this legislative action, California has joined the Seventh
Circuit 195 in banning prior restraint of all student publications except those
which are obscene, libelous, or create a clear and present danger in the
school setting.1 96 These standards thus bring the students' First Amend-
ment rights in line with those of adults.' 97
This statute represents the first large-scale effort 198 to categorically estab-
lish free press rights for the public school student. Legislation which pre-
tion, birth control and abortion, and faculty unions. Id.
193. But see notes 182-85 and accompanying text supra.
194. Relevant portions of the statutory section provide as follows:
Students of the public schools shall have the right to exercise freedom of speech
and of the press including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the dis-
tribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons, badges and other
insignia, and the right of expression in official publications, whether or not such
publications or other means of expression are supported financially by the school or
by use of school facilities, except that expression shall be prohibited which is
obscene, libelous or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material which so incites
students as to create a clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts
on school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or the substantial
disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
Each ... board of education shall adopt rules and regulations in the form of a
written publications code, which shall include reasonable provisions for the time,
place and manner of conducting such activities....
There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school publications
except insofar as it violates this section. School officials shall have the burden of
showing justification without undue delay prior to any limitation of student expres-
sion under this section.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit or prevent any governing board of a school
district to adopt otherwise valid rules and regulations relating to oral communication
by students upon the premises of each school.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48916 (West 1978).
195. See notes 126-36 and accompanying text supra.
196. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48916 (West 1978).
197. This statutory section only addresses student press rights, specifically providing that
"[niothing in this section shall prohibit or prevent any governing board of a school district to
adopt otherwise valid rules and regulations relating to oral communication by students upon
the premises of each school." Id. By its very nature, oral communication contains greater potential
for disruption of school operations (e.g., loud talking in hallways would interrupt scheduled
classroom activities) and can, therefore, be subject to more stringent time, place and manner
restrictions. It must be assumed, in light of the statute's strict protection of student press rights,
that the reference to "otherwise valid rules" is meant to be interpreted as allowing these time,
place, and manner restrictions, but prohibiting restrictions as to content or subject (unless, of
course, the speech is obscene, slanderous, substantially disruptive or which incites the commis-
sion of illegal acts on school premises).
198. As a consequence of federal litigation in this area, legal guidelines have been established
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vents unconstitutional restraint of student expression certainly is to be
applauded, and it is hoped that other states will take similar actions, 199 but
to be truly effective change must come from within the educational system
itself.
D. Curricular Response
The responses designed to have a long-term positive effect on student
exercise of free speech are those which are aimed at altering the school
curriculum so that it recognizes, fosters, and guides students in the responsi-
ble exercise of their newly acquired freedoms. The rationale for this curricu-
lar response to the judicial recognition of student rights is that, by teaching
students the substantive protections of their constitutional rights, as well as
the moral consequences and responsibilities inherent in those rights, the
feared abuses likely will not occur.
200
One education professor encouraged the profession to implement the
spirit as well as the letter of the law in order to better achieve the goal of
educating citizens to understand and honor constitutional freedoms. 20 1 In
suggesting appropriate steps for the school and community to take toward
realization of this goal, he stressed that educators, students, parents, and
community members should examine the principles inherent in the Bill of
Rights and analyze school policies and practices in light of those princi-
ples.20 2 Only then can changes be made which will translate principles into
practices. 2
0 3
Unfortunately, a more recent Article has indicated that such implementa-
tion is still in the developmental stages. Furnishing students with oppor-
tunities to apply their classroom knowledge by encouraging participation in
policy decision-making, disciplinary cases regarding the rights of their peers
and formulating rules to regulate their own behavior is advocated. 20 4 The
inclusion of law studies programs as a part of the school curriculum has been
especially helpful in this regard, since many such programs include materials
and activities on constitutional rights, which enables students to apply the
relevant legal principles to their own school environment.
20 5
for thousands of schools across the country. See Section II supra. Although it is to be hoped
that other schools will voluntarily bring their policies and regulations into conformity with
changes in the law, the specific rulings can be enforced only with respect to the litigants.
199. Even in the absence of statewide legislation, local school boards should be encouraged
to model their policies and rules after the California statute.
200. See Ratliff, Schools, Courts & Students' Freedom of Expression, 35 EDUC. LEADERSHIP
634, 637 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ratliff); Schwartz, Beyond the Court Cases: Curricular
Responses to the Student-Citizen, 32 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 128, 128-29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz].
201. Schwartz, supra note 200, at 129.
202. Id. at 130-32.
203. Id. at 132.
204. Ratliff, supra note 200, at 638.
205. Id. at 637-38. See generally R. GERLACH & L. LAMPRECHT, TEACHING ABOUT THE
LAW 23-59 (1975).
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Although progress is being made and many educators are endeavoring to
devise and implement programs to assure the knowledgeable and responsi-
ble exercise of First Amendment rights by students, it clearly will take more
than decrees from the judiciary to insure the continued possession of these
rights. The educators themselves need to be instructed as to the nature and
extent of their students' rights. If these officials are to be entrusted with the
civic development of our children, it is critical that they not only be cogni-
zant of the role of the First Amendment in the schools but also that they
take an active part in furthering its growth. 20 6 Students have come a long
way in establishing the right to publish their ideas and criticisms, but they
have yet a long way to go before that right may fully and uniformly be
exercised.
IV. CONCLUSION
There have been genuine advances in student rights' law in the decade
since the Gault-Ginsberg-Tinker trilogy, but there is a demonstrable lack of
recognition of this law by the very people who are charged with its im-
plementation. Student speech and press rights remain a privilege, albeit a
court-enforced privilege.
With the potential for abuse remaining strong in this extensively litigated
area, there clearly remains a need for extensive reform in the unlitigated
areas affecting children's rights. In the wake of Gault, gains have been made
in the area of juvenile court procedures. However, these gains stem in part
from the more explicit requirements mandated by the Court in Gault as well
as from a growing awareness of criminal justice abuses in general. But even
in this area, reforms in theory may not be realized in practice.2 0 7  For
example, with respect to physical integrity and safety, children are still pro-
tected only by the grace of the adults around them: search and seizure prin-
ciples developed in adult Fourth Amendment cases have not been uniformly
applied to students; 208 the Supreme Court refused to apply the Eighth
206. Ratliff cites three studies which indicate that educators have not yet responded to the
need for this expansion of the school curriculum: J. DECECCO, A. RICHARD, et at., Civic
EDUCATION FOR THE SEVENTIES: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION (1970)
(alluding to the lack of student opportunity to learn about their rights as one reason for the
students' view of schools as undemocratic institutions); K. Fox, Correlates of Adolescents'
Knowledge of the Legal Rights of Minors (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Uni-
versity) (a study of students in northern California which found that they needed and wanted
more information about their rights); survey by the Nat'l Assessment of Educational Progress,
reported in EDUC. DAILY 1-2 (Feb. 2, 1978) (reporting that from 1972 to 1976 the knowledge
of and support for constitutional rights among adolescents declined). Ratliff, supra note 200, at
637 n.7 and accompanying text.
207. This problem recently has been recognized by the Justice Department. The National
Center for State Courts has been given funding for a two-year study on the effect of the Gault
decision on 150 metropolitan courts. The study was prompted in part by criticism that courts
have complied only superficially with the requirements of Gault. 1 NAT'L L.J. 13 (Nov. 6,
1978).
208. See, e.g., Georgia v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975); In re Donaldson, 269
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Amendment to prevent corporal punishment of school children; 20 9 and fre-
quent studies report a rapidly rising incidence of child abuse with only
sporadic legislative, administrative, and judicial attempts to avert it.
2 10
Advocates of children's rights must continue the struggle to secure basic
constitutional rights for minors. The pursuit of First Amendment rights is
perhaps the most crucial step toward attainment of that goal. Only by
educating students-in the responsible exercise and protection of these most
cherished rights will we ensure the continued existence of a genuine "free
marketplace of ideas." And only by airing the problem of the shackled
rights of our minor citizens in that marketplace can realistic attempts be
made to cure this egregious void in our system of constitutionally protected
freedoms. Today's student must be given proper preparation to become to-
morrow's advocate.
Jill H. Krafte
Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); New York v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 283 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1967); Children and the Fourth Amendment, 1 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RPT. 1 (Sept. 1976). But
see Louisiana v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. Sup. Ct. 1975); New York v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d
483, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974). For a more extensive survey of school searches, see A. LEVINE,
E. CAREY & D. DIvoRKY, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS (1973) (A.C.L.U. Handbook); Buss, The
Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1974).
209. See note 67 supra.
210. See Katz, Ambrosino, McGrath & Sawitsky, Legal Research on Child Abuse and Ne-
glect: Past & Future, 11 FAM. L.Q. 151 (1977); Protecting Children By Reporting Parental
Neglect: A Second Look, 1 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RPT. 1 (April 1977).
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APPENDIX
Student Press Law Center
Model Guidelines
For Student Publications*
I. STATEMENT OF POLICY
It is undeniable that students are protected in their exercise of freedom of expression by the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Accordingly, it is the responsibility
of school officials to insure the maximum freedom of expression to all students.
It is the policy of the Board of Education that (newspaper)
NYearbook) , and (literary magazine) , official, school-sponsored publi-
cations of High School have been established as forums for student expression. As a
forum, each publication should provide a full opportunity for students to inquire, question and
exchange ideas. Content should reflect all areas of student interest, including topics about which
there may be dissent or controversy.
It is the policy of the Board of Education that student journalists shall have the
ultimate and absolute right to determine the content of official student publications.
II. OFFICIAL SCHOOL PUBLICATIONS
A. Responsibilities of Student Journalists
Students who work on official student publications will:
1. Rewrite material, as required by the faculty advisers, to improve sentence structure,
grammar, spelling and punctuation;
2. Check and verify all facts and verify the accuracy of all quotations;
3. In the case of editorials or letters to the editor concerning controversial issues, provide
space for rebuttal comments and opinions;
4. Determine the content of the student publication.
B. Prohibited Material
1. Students cannot publish or distribute material which is "obscene as to minors". Obscene as
to minors is defined as:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that
the publication, taken as a whole, appeals to a minor's prurient interest in sex; and
(b) the publication depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
such as ultimate sexual acts (normal or perverted), masturbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
(c) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
(d) "Minor" means any person under the age of eighteen.
2. Students cannot publish or distribute material which is "libelous", defined as a false and
unprivileged statement about a specific individual which injures the individual's reputation in
the community. If the allegedly libeled individual is a "public figure" or "public official" as
defined below, then school officials must show that the false statement was published "with
actual malice", i.e., that the student journalists knew that the statement was false, or that they
published the statement with reckless disregard for the truth-without trying to verify the
truthfulness of the statement.
(a) A public official is a person who holds an elected or appointed public office.
(b) A public figure is a person who either seeks the public's attention or is well known
because of his achievements.
(c) School employees are to be considered public officials or public figures in articles
concerning their school-related activities.
* 2 STUDENT PREss L. CENTER RprR. 33-34 (Winter 1978-79).
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(d) When an allegedly libelous statement concerns a private individual, school officials
must show that the false statement was published willfully or negligently, i.e., the student
journalist has failed to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise.
(e) Under the "fair comment rule" a student is free to express an opinion on matters of
public interest. Specifically, a student enjoys a privilege to criticize the performance of
teachers, administrators, school officials and other school employees.
3. Students cannot publish or distribute material which will cause "a material and substantial
disruption of school activities."
(a) Disruption is defined as student rioting; unlawful seizures of property; destruction of
property; widespread shouting or boisterous conduct; or substantial student participation
in a school boycott, sit-in, stand-in, walk-out or other related form of activity. Material
that stimulates heated discussion or debate does not constitute the type of disruption
prohibited.
(b) In order for a student publication to be considered disruptive, there must exist
specific facts upon which it would be reasonable to forecast that a clear and present
likelihood of an immediate, substantial material disruption to normal school activity would
occur if the material were distributed. Mere undifferentiated fear or apprehension of dis-
turbance is not enough; school administrators must be able to affirmatively show substan-
tial facts which reasonably support a forecast of likely disruption.
(c) In determining whether a student publication is disruptive, consideration must be
given to the context of the distribution as well as the content of the material. In this
regard, consideration should be given to past experience in the school with similar mate-
rial, past experience in the school in dealing with and supervising the students in the
subject school, current events influencing student attitudes and behavior, and whether or
not there have been any instances of actual or threatened disruption prior to or contem-
poraneously with the dissemination of the student publication in question.
(d) School officials must act to protect the safety of advocates of unpopular viewpoints.
(e) "School activity"-means educational activity of students sponsored by the school
and includes, by way of example and not by way of limitation, classroom work, library
activities, physical education classes, individual decision time, official assemblies and
other similar gatherings, school athletic contests, band concerts, school plays, and
scheduled in-school lunch periods.
C. Legal Advice
1. If, in the opinion of the student editor, student editorial staff or faculty adviser, material
proposed for publication may be "obscene", "libelous", or "cause a substantial disruption of
school activities", the legal opinion of a practicing attorney should be sought. It is recom-
mended that the services of the attorney for the local newspaper be used.
2. Legal fees charged in connection with this consultation will be paid by the board of educa-
tion.
3. The final decision of whether the material is to be published will be left to the student
editor or student editorial staff.
II. PROTECTED SPEECH
School officials cannot:
1. Barr the publication or distribution of birth control information in student publications;
2. Censor or punish the occasional use of vulgar or so-called "four-letter" words in student
publications;
3. Prohibit criticism of school policies or practices;
4. Cut off funds to official student publications because of disagreement over editorial policy;
5. Ban speech which merely advocates illegal conduct without proving that such speech is
directed toward and will actually cause imminent lawless action;
6. Ban the publication or distribution of material written by nonstudents;
7. Prohibit the school newspaper from accepting advertising.
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IV. NONSCHOOL-SPONSORED PUBLICATIONS
School officials may not ban the distribution of nonschool-sponsored publications on school
grounds. However, students who violate any rule listed under 11.B. may be disciplined after
distribution.
1. School officials may regulate the time, place and manner of distribution.
(a) Nonschool-sponsored publications will have the same rights of distribution as official
school publications.
(b) "Distribution"-means dissemination of a publication to students at a time and place of
normal school activity, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, by means of handing out
free copies, selling or offering copies for sale, accepting donations for copies of the publication,
or displaying the student publication in areas of the school which are generally frequented by
students.
2. School officials cannot:
(a) Prohibit the distribution of anonymous literature or require that literature bear the
name of the sponsoring organization or author;
(b) Ban the distribution of literature because it contains advertising;
(c) Ban the sale of literature.
V. ADVISER JOB SECURITY
No teacher who advises a student publication will be fired, transferred or removed from the
advisership for failure to exercise editorial control over the student publication or to otherwise
suppress the rights of free expression of student journalists.
VI. PRIOR RESTRAINT
No student publication, whether nonschool-sponsored or official, will be reviewed by school
administrators prior to distribution.
VII. CIRCULATION
These guidelines will be included in the handbook on student rights and responsibilities and
circulated to all students in attendance.
